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This paper analyzes securitization and, more generally, “special purpose
vehicles” (SPVs), which are now pervasive in corporate ﬁnance.1 What is
the source of value to organizing corporate activity using SPVs? We argue
that SPVs exist in large part to reduce bankruptcy costs, and we ﬁnd evi-
dence consistent with this view, using unique data on credit card securitiza-
tions. The way in which the reduction in costs is accomplished sheds some
light on how bank risk should be assessed.
By ﬁnancing the ﬁrm in pieces, some on–balance sheet and some oﬀ–
balance sheet, control rights to business decisions are separated from ﬁ-
nancing decisions. The SPV-sponsoring ﬁrm maintains control over busi-
ness decisions, whereas the ﬁnancing is done in SPVs, which are passive;
they cannot make business decisions. Furthermore, the SPVs are not sub-
ject to bankruptcy costs because they cannot in practice go bankrupt, as a
matter of design. Bankruptcy is a process of transferring control rights
over corporate assets. Securitization reduces the amount of assets that are
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1. In the following we present evidence on the use of SPVs in the cases where such data exist.
As explained subsequently, these are “qualiﬁed” SPVs. Data on other types of SPVs are not
systematically collected.of SPVs depends on implicit contractual arrangements that avoid account-
ing and regulatory impediments to reducing bankruptcy costs. We develop
a model of oﬀ–balance sheet ﬁnancing and test the implications of the
model.
An SPV, or a special purpose entity (SPE), is a legal entity created by a
ﬁrm (known as the sponsor or originator) by transferring assets to the SPV,
to carry out some speciﬁc purpose or circumscribed activity, or a series of
such transactions. SPVs have no purpose other than the transaction(s) for
which they were created, and they can make no substantive decisions; the
rules governing them are set down in advance and carefully circumscribe
their activities. Indeed, no one works at an SPV and it has no physical lo-
cation.
The legal form for an SPV may be a limited partnership, a limited liabil-
ity company, a trust, or a corporation.2 Typically, oﬀ–balance sheet SPVs
have the following characteristics:
• They are thinly capitalized.
• They have no independent management or employees.
• Their administrative functions are performed by a trustee who follows
prespeciﬁed rules with regard to the receipt and distribution of cash;
there are no other decisions.
• Assets held by the SPV are serviced via a servicing arrangement.
• They are structured so that, as a practical matter, they cannot become
bankrupt.
In short, SPVs are essentially robot ﬁrms that have no employees, make
no substantive economic decisions, have no physical location, and cannot
go bankrupt. Oﬀ–balance sheet ﬁnancing arrangements can take the form
of research and development limited partnerships, leasing transactions, or
asset securitizations, to name the most prominent.3 And less visible are tax
arbitrage-related transactions. In this paper we address the question of why
SPVs exist.
The existence of SPVs raises important issues for the theory of the ﬁrm:
what is a ﬁrm and what are its boundaries? Does a “ﬁrm” include the SPVs
that it sponsors? (From an accounting or tax point of view, this is the issue
of consolidation.) What is the relationship between a sponsoring ﬁrm and
its SPV? In what sense does the sponsor control the SPV? Are investors in-
diﬀerent between investing in SPV securities and the sponsor’s securities?
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2. There are also a number of vehicles that owe their existence to special legislation. These
include real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs), ﬁnancial asset securitization in-
vestment trusts (FASITs), regulated investment companies (RICs), and real estate investment
trusts (REITs). In particular, their tax status is subject to speciﬁc tax code provisions. See
Kramer (2003).
3. On research and development limited partnerships see, for example, Shevlin (1987) and
Beatty, Berger, and Magliolo (1995); on leasing see, for example, Hodge (1996, 1998), and
Weidner (2000). Securitization is later discussed in detail.To make headway on these questions we ﬁrst theoretically investigate the
question of the existence of SPVs. Then we test some implications of the
theory, using unique data on credit card securitizations.
One argument for why SPVs are used is that sponsors may beneﬁt from a
lower cost of capital, because sponsors can remove debt from the balance
sheet, so balance sheet leverage is reduced. Enron, which created over 3,000
oﬀ–balance sheet SPVs, is the leading example of this (see Klee and Butler
2002). But Enron was able to keep their oﬀ–balance sheet debt from being
observed by investors, and so obtained a lower cost of capital. If market par-
ticipants are aware of the oﬀ–balance sheet vehicles, and assuming that
these vehicles truly satisfy the legal and accounting requirements to be oﬀ–
balance sheet, then it is not immediately obvious how this lowers the cost of
capital for the sponsor. In the context of operating leases Lim, Mann, and
Mihov (2003) ﬁnd that bond yields reﬂect oﬀ–balance sheet debt.4
The key issue concerns why otherwise equivalent debt issued by the SPV
is priced or valued diﬀerently than on–balance sheet debt by investors. The
diﬀerence between on– and oﬀ–balance sheet debt turns on the question of
what is meant by the phrase “truly satisfy the legal and accounting require-
ments to be oﬀ–balance sheet.” In this paper we argue that “oﬀ–balance
sheet” is not a completely accurate description of what is going on. The
diﬃculty lies in the distinction between formal contracts (which are subject
to accounting and regulatory rules) and relational or implicit contracts.
Relational contracts are arrangements that circumvent the diﬃculties of
formally contracting (that is, entering into an arrangement that can be en-
forced by the legal system).5
While there are formal requirements, reviewed subsequently, for deter-
mining the relationships between sponsors and their SPVs, including when
the SPVs are not consolidated and when the SPVs’ debts are oﬀ–balance
sheet, this is not the whole story. There are other, implicit, contractual re-
lations. The relational contract we focus on concerns sponsors’ support of
their SPVs in certain states of the world, and investors’ reliance on this sup-
port, even though sponsors are not legally bound to support their SPVs—
and in fact, under accounting and regulatory rules, are not supposed to
provide support.
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4. There are other accounting motivations for setting up oﬀ–balance sheet SPVs. For ex-
ample, Shakespeare (2001, 2003) argues, in the context of securitization, that managers use
the gains from securitization to meet earnings targets and analysts’ earnings forecasts. This is
based on the discretionary element of how the “gain on sale” is booked. Calomiris and Ma-
son (2004) consider regulatory capital arbitrage as a motivation for securitization, but con-
clude in favor of the “eﬃcient contracting view,” by which they mean that “banks use securi-
tization with recourse to permit them to set capital relative to risk in a manner consistent with
market, rather than regulatory, capital requirements and to permit them to overcome prob-
lems of asymmetric information” (p. 26).
5. On relational contracts in the context of the theory of the ﬁrm see Baker, Gibbons, and
Murphy (2002) and the references cited therein.The possibility of this implicit support, “implicit recourse,” or “moral
recourse” has been noted by regulators, rating agencies, and academic re-
searchers. U.S. bank regulators deﬁne implicit recourse or moral recourse
as the “provision of credit support, beyond contractual obligations . . .”
See Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency et al. (2002, p. 1). The OCC
goes on to oﬀer guidance as to how bank examiners are to detect this prob-
lem. An example of the rating agency view is that of FitchIBCA (1999):
“Although not legally required, issuers [sponsors] may feel compelled to
support a securitization and absorb credit risk beyond the residual expo-
sure. In eﬀect, there is moral recourse since failure to support the securiti-
zation may impair future access to the capital markets” (p. 4). Gorton and
Pennacchi (1989, 1995) ﬁrst discussed the issue of implicit recourse in ﬁ-
nancial markets in the context of the bank loan sales market; they also pro-
vide some empirical evidence for its existence.
Nonetheless, there are many unanswered questions. Why are SPVs valu-
able? Are they equally valuable to all ﬁrms? Why do sponsors oﬀer re-
course? How is the implicit arrangement self-enforcing? The details of how
the arrangement works and, in particular, how it is a source of value have
never been explained. We show that the value of the relational contract, in
terms of cost of capital for the sponsor, is related to the details of the legal
and accounting structure, which we subsequently explain. To brieﬂy fore-
shadow the arguments to come, the key point is that SPVs cannot in prac-
tice go bankrupt. In the United States it is not possible to waive the right
to have access to the government’s bankruptcy procedure, but it is possible
to structure an SPV so that there cannot be “an event of default” that
would throw the SPV into bankruptcy. This means that debt issued by the
SPV should not include a premium reﬂecting expected bankruptcy costs,
as there never will be any such costs.6 So, one beneﬁt to sponsors is that the
oﬀ–balance sheet debt should be cheaper, ceteris paribus. However, there
are potential costs to oﬀ–balance sheet debt. One is the ﬁxed cost of setting
up the SPV. Another is that there is no tax advantage of oﬀ–balance sheet
debt to the SPV sponsor. Depending on the structure of the SPV, the inter-
est expense of oﬀ–balance sheet debt may not be tax deductible.
After reviewing the institutional detail, which is particularly important
for this subject, we develop these ideas in the context of a simple model,
and then test some implications of the model using data on credit card se-
curitizations. The model analysis unfolds in steps. First, we determine a
benchmark corresponding to the value of the stand-alone ﬁrm, which is-
sues debt to investors in the capital markets. For concreteness we refer to
this ﬁrm as a bank. The bank makes an eﬀort choice to create assets of
types that are unobservable to the outside investors. Step two considers the
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6. However, as we discuss subsequently, the debt may be repaid early due to early amorti-
zation. This is a kind of prepayment risk from the point of view of the investors.situation where the assets can be allocated between on– and oﬀ–balance
sheet ﬁnancing, but the allocation of the assets occurs before the quality of
individual assets has been determined. From the point of view of investors
in the SPV’s debt, there is a moral hazard problem in that the bank may not
make an eﬀort to create high-value assets. The sponsoring bank’s decision
problem depends on bankruptcy costs, taxes, and other considerations. We
provide conditions under which it is optimal for the sponsoring bank to use
an SPV.
The third step allows the bank to allocate assets after it has determined
the qualities of its individual assets. In other words, investors in the debt is-
sued by the SPV face an additional problem. In addition to the moral haz-
ard associated with the eﬀort choice, there is an adverse selection problem
with regard to which projects are allocated to the SPV. We call this prob-
lem the “strategic adverse selection problem.” In the case without commit-
ment, investors will not buy the debt of the SPV because they cannot over-
come the strategic adverse selection problem. However, we show that if the
sponsor can commit to subsidize the SPV in states of the world where the
SPV’s assets are low quality and the sponsor’s on–balance sheet assets are
high quality, then the SPV is viable. In particular, if the bank can commit
to subsidize the SPV in certain states of the world, then the proﬁtability of
the bank is the same as it would be when projects were allocated between
the bank and the SPV prior to their realization, that is, when there was no
strategic adverse selection.
But how does the commitment happen? Sponsors cannot veriﬁably com-
mit to state-contingent subsidies. Even if they could veriﬁably commit to
such strategies, legal considerations would make this undesirable because
the courts view such recourse as meaning that the assets were never sold to
the SPV in the ﬁrst place. In this case, the SPV is not bankruptcy remote,
meaning that creditors of the sponsoring ﬁrm could “claw back” the SPV’s
assets in a bankruptcy proceeding. As Klee and Butler (2002) write:
The presence of recourse is the most important aspect of risk allocation
because it suggests that the parties intended a loan and not a sale. If the
parties had intended a sale, then the buyer would have retained the risk
of default, not the seller. The greater the recourse the SPV has against the
Originator, through for example chargebacks or adjustments to the pur-
chase price, the more the transfer resembles a disguised loan rather than
a sale. Courts diﬀer on the weight they attach to the presence of recourse
provisions. Some courts view the presence of such a provision as nearly
conclusive of the parties’ intent to create a security interest, while others
view recourse as only one of a number of factors. (p. 52)
This means that, as a practical matter, the recourse must not be explicit,
cannot be formalized, and must be subtle and rare.
The ﬁnal step in the analysis is to show that in a repeated context it is
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familiar use of trigger strategies (e.g., Friedman 1971, and Green and
Porter 1984), which create an incentive for the sponsor to follow the im-
plicit arrangement. Previous applications of such strategies involve set-
tings of oligopolistic competition, where ﬁrms want to collude but cannot
observe strategic price or quantity choices of rivals. Intertemporal incen-
tives to collude are maintained via punishment periods triggered by devia-
tions from the implicit collusive arrangements. Our application is quite
diﬀerent. Here, ﬁrms sponsoring SPVs “collude” with the investors in the
SPVs by agreeing to the state-contingent subsidization of the SPV—re-
course that is prohibited by accounting and regulatory rules. In this sense
SPVs are a kind of regulatory arbitrage.
Two empirically testable implications follow from the theoretical anal-
ysis. First, because the value in using SPVs derives in large part from avoid-
ing bankruptcy costs, riskier ﬁrms should be more likely to engage in oﬀ–
balance sheet ﬁnancing. Mills and Newberry (2004) ﬁnd that riskier ﬁrms
use more oﬀ–balance sheet debt. Also, see Moody’s (1997a and 1997b).
Second, following Gorton and Pennacchi (1989, 1995), implicit recourse
implies that investors in the debt of the SPV incorporate expectations
about the risk of the sponsor. This is because the sponsor must exist in or-
der to subsidize the SPV in some states of the world. As Moody’s (1997b)
puts it: “Part of the reason for the favorable pricing of the [SPVs’] securi-
ties is the perception on the part of many investors that originators (i.e., the
‘sponsors’ of the securitizations) will voluntarily support—beyond that for
which they are contractually obligated—transactions in which asset per-
formance deteriorates signiﬁcantly in the future. Many originators have, in
fact, taken such actions in the past” (p. 40).
We test these two implications using unique data on credit card securi-
tizations. We focus on securitization, a key form of oﬀ–balance sheet ﬁ-
nancing, because of data availability. Credit cards are a particularly inter-
esting asset class because they involve revolving credits that are repeatedly
sold into SPVs. Moreover, they represent the largest category within non-
mortgage securitizations.
We ﬁnd that, even controlling for the quality of the underlying assets and
other factors, investors do require signiﬁcantly higher yields for credit card
asset-backed securities (ABS) issued by riskier sponsors, as measured by
the sponsors’ credit ratings. Also, riskier ﬁrms generally securitize more,
ceteris paribus. These results are consistent with our model.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 12.2 we provide some back-
ground information on oﬀ–balance sheet vehicles in general. Then, in sec-
tion 12.3 we focus more narrowly on some of the details of how securitiza-
tion vehicles in particular work. Section 12.4 presents and analyzes a
model of oﬀ–balance sheet ﬁnancing. In section 12.5 we explain and review
the datasets used in the empirical work. The ﬁrst hypothesis, concerning
the existence of implicit recourse, is tested in section 12.6. The second hy-
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section 12.8 concludes, and is followed by a mathematical appendix.
12.2 Background on SPVs
In this section we brieﬂy review some of the important institutional
background for understanding SPVs and their relation to their sponsor.
12.2.1 Legal Form of the SPV
A special purpose vehicle or special purpose entity is a legal entity that
has been set up for a speciﬁc, limited purpose by another entity, the spon-
soring ﬁrm. An SPV can take the form of a corporation, trust, partnership,
or a limited liability company. The SPV may be a subsidiary of the spon-
soring ﬁrm, or it may be an orphan SPV, one that is not consolidated with
the sponsoring ﬁrm for tax, accounting, or legal purposes (or may be con-
solidated for some purposes but not others).
In securitization, the SPV most commonly takes the legal form of a trust.
A trust is a legal construct in which a ﬁduciary relationship is created with
respect to some property. A trustee then has duties to perform for the ben-
eﬁt of third party beneﬁciaries. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts. Often
the SPV is a charitable or purpose trust. These traditional trusts have been
transformed into a vehicle with a diﬀerent economic substance than what
was perhaps contemplated by the law. These transformed trusts—commer-
cial trusts—are very diﬀerent from the traditional trusts (see Schwarcz
2003a, Langbein 1997, and Sitkoﬀ 2003).
A purpose trust (called a STAR trust in the Cayman Islands) is a trust
set up to fulﬁll speciﬁc purposes rather than for beneﬁciaries. A charitable
trust has charities as the beneﬁciaries. For many transactions there are
beneﬁts if the SPV is domiciled oﬀshore, usually in Bermuda, the Cayman
Islands, or the British Virgin Islands.
12.2.2 Accounting
A key question for an SPV (from the point of view of SPV sponsors, if
not economists) is whether the SPV is oﬀ–balance sheet or not with respect
to some other entity. This is an accounting issue, which turns on the ques-
tion of whether the transfer of receivables from the sponsor to the SPV is
treated as a sale or a loan for accounting purposes.7 The requirements for
the transfer to be treated as a sale, and hence receive oﬀ–balance sheet
treatment, are set out in Financial Accounting Standard No. 140 (FAS
140), “Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Ex-
tinguishment of Liabilities,” promulgated in September 2000.8 FAS 140 es-
Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization 555
7. If the conditions of a sale are met, then the transferor must recognize a gain or loss on
the sale.
8. Prior to FAS 140 the issue was addressed by FAS 125. FAS 140 was intended to clarify
several outstanding questions left ambiguous in FAS 125.sentially has two broad requirements for a “true sale.” First, the SPV must
be a qualifying SPV, and second, the sponsor must surrender control of the
receivables.
In response to Enron’s demise, the Financial Accounting Standard
Board (FASB) adopted FASB Interpretation No. 46 (FIN 46; revised De-
cember 2003), “Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities, an Interpreta-
tion of Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) No. 51,” which has the aim of
improving ﬁnancial reporting and disclosure by companies with variable
interest entities (VIEs).9 Basically, FASB’s view is that the then-current ac-
counting rules that determined whether an SPV should be consolidated
were inadequate. Because FASB had diﬃculty deﬁning an SPV, it created
the VIE concept. FIN 46 sets forth a new measure of ﬁnancial control, one
based not on majority of voting interests, but instead on who holds the
majority of the residual risk and obtains the majority of the beneﬁts, or
both—independent of voting power.
A “qualifying” SPV (QSPV) is an SPV that meets the requirements set
forth in FAS 140; otherwise, it is treated as a VIE in accordance with FIN
46. FIN 46 does not apply to QSPVs. To be a qualifying SPV means that
the vehicle: (1) is “demonstrably distinct” from the sponsor, (2) is signiﬁ-
cantly limited in its permitted activities, and these activities are entirely
speciﬁed by the legal documents deﬁning its existence, (3) holds only “pas-
sive” receivables—that is, there are no decisions to be made, and (4) has the
right, if any, to sell or otherwise dispose of noncash receivables only in “au-
tomatic response” to the occurrence of certain events. The term “demon-
strably distinct,” means that the sponsor cannot have the ability to unilat-
erally dissolve the SPV, and that at least 10 percent of the fair value (of its
beneﬁcial interests) must be held by unrelated third parties.
On the second requirement of FAS 140, the important aspect of surren-
dering control is that the sponsor cannot retain eﬀective control over the
transferred assets through an ability to unilaterally cause the SPV to return
speciﬁc assets (other than through a cleanup call or, to some extent, re-
moval of accounts provisions).
FAS 140 states that the sponsor need not include the debt of a qualifying
SPV subsidiary in the sponsor’s consolidated ﬁnancial statements.
A QSPV must be a separate and distinct legal entity—separate and dis-
tinct, that is, from the sponsor (the sponsor does not consolidate the SPV
for accounting reasons). It must be an automaton in the sense that there are
no substantive decisions for it to ever make, simply rules that must be fol-
lowed; it must be bankruptcy remote, meaning that the bankruptcy of the
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9. VIEs are deﬁned by FASB to be entities that do not have suﬃcient equity to ﬁnance their
activities without additional subordinated support. It also includes entities where the equity
holders do not have voting or other rights to make decisions about the equity, are not eﬀec-
tively residual claimants, and do not have the right to expected residual returns.sponsor has no implications for the SPV, and the SPV itself must (as a prac-
tical matter) never be able to become bankrupt.
12.2.3 Bankruptcy
An essential feature of an SPV is that it be bankruptcy remote. This
means that should the sponsoring ﬁrm enter a bankruptcy procedure, the
ﬁrm’s creditors cannot seize the assets of the SPV. It also means that the
SPV itself can never become legally bankrupt. The most straightforward
way to achieve this would be for the SPV to waive its right to ﬁle a voluntary
bankruptcy petition, but this is legally unenforceable (see Klee and Butler
2002, p. 33 ﬀ.). The only way to completely eliminate the risk of either vol-
untary or involuntary bankruptcy is to create the SPV in a legal form that is
ineligible to be a debtor under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The SPV can be
structured to achieve this result. As described by Klee and Butler: “The use
of SPVs is simply a disguised form of bankruptcy waiver” (p. 34).
To make the SPV as bankruptcy remote as possible, its activities can be
restricted. For instance, it can be restricted from issuing debt beyond a
stated limit. Standard and Poor’s (2002) lists the following traditional char-
acteristics for a bankrupt-remote SPV:
• Restrictions on objects, powers, and purposes
• Limitations on ability to incur indebtedness
• Restrictions or prohibitions on merger, consolidation, dissolution, liq-
uidation, winding up, asset sales, transfers of equity interests, and
amendments to the organizational documents relating to “separate-
ness”
• Incorporation of separateness covenants restricting dealings with par-
ents and aﬃliates
• “Nonpetition” language (i.e., a covenant not to ﬁle the SPE into in-
voluntary bankruptcy)
• Security interests over assets
• An independent director (or functional equivalent) whose consent is
required for the ﬁling of a voluntary bankruptcy petition
The SPV can also obtain agreements from its creditors that they will not
ﬁle involuntary petitions for bankruptcy. Depending on the legal form of
the SPV, it may require more structure to ensure eﬀective bankruptcy re-
moteness. For example, if the SPV is a corporation, where the power to ﬁle
a voluntary bankruptcy petition lies with the board of directors, then the
charter or by-laws can be structured to require unanimity. Sometimes char-
ters or by-laws have provisions that negate the board’s discretion unless
certain other criteria are met.
An involuntary bankruptcy occurs under certain circumstances (see
Section 303[b] of the Bankruptcy Code). Chief among the criteria is non-
payment of debts as they become due. Perhaps most important for securi-
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ised coupon payments can lead to early amortization rather than an event
of default on the debt. This is subsequently discussed further.
There is also the risk that if the sponsor of the SPV goes bankrupt, the
bankruptcy judge will recharacterize the “true sale” of assets to the SPV as
a secured ﬁnancing, which would bring the assets back onto the bankrupt
sponsor’s balance sheet. Or the court may consolidate the assets of the
sponsor and the SPV. As a result of this risk, most structured ﬁnancings
have a two-tiered structure involving two SPVs. The sponsor often retains
a residual interest in the SPV that provides a form of credit enhancement,
but the residual interest may preclude a true sale. Consequently, the resid-
ual interest is held by another SPV, not the sponsor. The true sale occurs
with respect to this second vehicle. This is shown in ﬁgure 12.1, which is
taken from Moody’s (2002a).
12.2.4 Taxes
There are two tax issues.10First, how is the SPV taxed? Second, what are
the tax implications of the SPV’s debt for the sponsoring ﬁrm? We brieﬂy
summarize the answers to these questions.
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10. This subsection is based on Kramer (2003), Peaslee and Nirenberg (2001), and
Humphreys and Kreistman (1995).
Fig. 12.1 A two-tiered bankruptcy remote structure
Source: Moody’s (August 30, 2002).The ﬁrst question is easier to answer. SPVs are usually structured to be
tax neutral, that is, so that their proﬁts are not taxed. The failure to achieve
tax neutrality would usually result in taxes being imposed once on the in-
come of the sponsor and once again on the distributions from the SPV. This
“double tax” would most likely make SPVs unproﬁtable for the sponsor.
There are a number of ways to design an SPV to achieve tax neutrality. We
brieﬂy review some of them.
Many SPVs are incorporated in a tax haven jurisdiction, such as the
Cayman Islands, where they are treated as “exempted companies.” See
Ashman (2000). An exempted company is not permitted to conduct busi-
ness in, for example, the Cayman Islands, and in return is awarded a total
tax holiday for twenty years, with the possibility of a ten-year extension.
Because such entities are not organized or created in the United States,
they are not subject to U.S. federal income tax, except to the extent that
their income arises from doing business in the United States. However, the
organizational documents for the SPV will limit it so that for purposes of
the U.S. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, it can be construed as not being
“engaged in U.S. trade or business.”
An investment trust that issues pass-through certiﬁcates is tax neutral;
that is, the trust is ignored for tax purposes—there is no taxation at the
trust level—and the certiﬁcate owners are subject to tax. Pass-through cer-
tiﬁcates represent pro rata interests in the underlying pool. To maintain
this tax-neutral status, it is important that the SPV not be reclassiﬁed as a
corporation. To avoid such reclassiﬁcation, the trustee must have no power
to vary the investments in the asset pool, and its activities must be limited
to conserving and protecting the assets for the beneﬁt of the beneﬁciaries
of the trust. See Kramer (2003).
More common than pass-through structures are pay-through structures.
Pay-through bonds are issued by SPVs that are corporations or owner
trusts. In these structures, the SPVs issue bonds, but this requires that there
be a party that holds the residual risk, an equity holder. If the SPV is a cor-
poration, then the pay-through bonds have minimal tax at the corporate
level because the SPV’s taxable income or loss is the diﬀerence between the
yields on its assets and the coupons on its pay-through bonds. Typically
these are matched as closely as possible.
The second question is more complicated. Some SPVs achieve oﬀ–
balance sheet status for accounting purposes but not for tax purposes. Se-
curitizations can ﬁt into this category because they can be treated as se-
cured ﬁnancing for tax purposes.
12.2.5 Credit Enhancement
Because the SPV’s business activities are constrained and its ability to in-
cur debt is limited, it faces the risk of a shortfall of cash below what it is ob-
ligated to pay investors. This chance is minimized via credit enhancement.
Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization 559The most important form of credit enhancement occurs via tranching of
the risk of loss due to default of the underlying borrowers. Tranching takes
the form of a capital structure for the SPV, with some senior-rated tranches
sold to investors in the capital markets (called A notes and B notes), a jun-
ior security (called a C note) which is typically privately placed, and vari-
ous forms of equity-like claims. Credit enhancement takes a variety of
other forms as well, including over-collateralization, securities backed by 
a letter of credit, or a surety bond, or a tranche may be guaranteed by a
monoline insurance company. There may also be internal reserve funds
that build-up and diminish based on various criteria. We will review this in
more detail later with respect to credit card securitization in particular.
12.2.6 The Use of Oﬀ–Balance Sheet Financing
Oﬀ–balance sheet ﬁnancing is, by deﬁnition, excluded from the spon-
sor’s ﬁnancial statement balance sheet, and so it is not systematically re-
ported. Consequently, it is hard to say how extensive the use of SPVs has
become. Qualiﬁed oﬀ–balance sheet SPVs that are used for asset securiti-
zation usually issue publicly rated debt, so there is more data about these
vehicles. This data is presented and discussed in the following. SPVs that
are not qualiﬁed, however, are hidden, as was revealed by the demise of En-
ron. Enron led to assertions that the use of oﬀ–balance sheet SPVs is ex-
treme.11 But, in fact, the extent of the use of SPVs is unknown.
12.3 Securitization
Securitization is one of the more visible forms of the use of oﬀ–balance
sheet SPVs because securitization uses qualiﬁed SPVs and involves selling
registered, rated securities in the capital markets. Consequently, there is
data available. Our empirical work will concentrate on credit card receiv-
ables securitization. In this section we brieﬂy review the important features
of securitization SPVs.
12.3.1 Overview of Securitization
Securitization involves the following steps: (1) a sponsor or originator of
receivables sets up the bankruptcy-remote SPV, pools the receivables, and
transfers them to the SPV as a true sale; (2) the cash ﬂows are tranched into
asset-backed securities, the most senior of which are rated and issued in the
market; (3) the proceeds are used to purchase the receivables from the
sponsor; (4) the pool revolves, in that over a period of time the principal re-
ceived on the underlying receivables is used to purchase new receivables;
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11. For example, Henry et al. (2002, p. 36): “Hundreds of respected U.S. companies are fer-
reting away trillions of dollars in debt in oﬀ–balance sheet subsidiaries, partnerships, and as-
sorted obligations.”and (5) there is a ﬁnal amortization period, during which all payments re-
ceived from the receivables are used to pay down tranche principal
amounts. Credit card receivables are diﬀerent from other pools of under-
lying loans because the underlying loan to the consumer is a revolving
credit; it has no natural maturity, unlike an automobile loan, for example.
Consequently, the maturity of the SPV debt is determined arbitrarily by
stating that receivable payments after a certain date are “principal” pay-
ments.
Figure 12.2 shows a schematic drawing of a typical securitization trans-
action. The diagram shows the two key steps in the securitization process:
pooling and tranching. Pooling and tranching correspond to diﬀerent
types of risk. Pooling minimizes the potential adverse selection problem
associated with the selection of the assets to be sold to the SPV. Condi-
tional on selection of the assets, tranching divides the risk of loss due to de-
fault based on seniority. Since tranching is based on seniority, the risk of
loss due to default of the underlying assets is stratiﬁed, with the residual
risks borne by the sponsor.
Securitization is a signiﬁcant and growing phenomenon. Figure 12.3
and table 12.1 provide some information on nonmortgage QSPV out-
standing amounts. The ﬁgure shows that the liabilities of nonmortgage ve-
hicles grew rapidly since the late 1990s, and by 2004 amounted to almost
$1.8 trillion. Table 12.1 shows the breakdown by type of receivable. Note
that credit card receivables are the largest component of (nonmortgage) as-
set-backed securities. See Kendall and Fishman (1996) and Johnson (2002)
for earlier discussions of securitization in the United States, and Moody’s
(2003) on the growth of securitization internationally.
Closely related to securitization is asset-backed commercial paper
(ABCP). Asset-backed commercial paper SPVs are called “conduits.”
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Fig. 12.2 Schematic of a securitization transactionABCP conduits are bankruptcy-remote SPVs that ﬁnance the purchase of
receivables primarily through issuing commercial paper. ABCP conduits
are also very large. The U.S. commercial paper market, as of August 2004,
stood at $1.3 trillion, having grown from $570 billion in January 1991. Fig-
ure 12.4 shows the ratio of ABCP to total outstanding commercial paper
over the last twelve years. Over half of the total now consists of ABCP.12
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12. ABCP conduits are an interesting topic in the own right. See Moody’s (1993),
FitchIBCA (2001), Elmer (1999), Croke (2003), and Standard and Poor’s (2002). ABCP con-
duits can be multiseller, meaning that the receivables in the conduit have been originated by
diﬀerent institutions.
Fig. 12.3 Total non-mortgage ABS/CDO outstandings
Source: Bond Market Association.
Table 12.1 Asset-backed securities outstanding amounts
Credit Home Manufactured Student Equipment 
Cars cards equity housing loans leases CBO/CDO Other
1995 59.5 153.1 33.1 11.2 3.7 10.6 1.2 43.9
1996 71.4 180.7 51.6 14.6 10.1 23.7 1.4 50.9
1997 77 214.5 90.2 19.1 18.3 35.2 19. 62.5
1998 86.9 236.7 124.2 25 25 41.1 47.6 144.7
1999 114.1 257.9 141.9 33.8 36.4 51.4 84.6 180.7
2000 133.1 306.3 151.5 36.9 41.1 58.8 124.5 219.6
2001 187.9 361.9 185.1 42.7 60.2 70.2 167.1 206.1
2002 221.7 397.9 286.5 44.5 74.4 68.3 234.5 215.4
2003 234.5 401.9 346 44.3 99.2 70.1 250.9 246.8
2004 Q1 238.3 406.5 385.1 43.9 102.4 68.7 253.3 250.4
Source: Bond Market Association.12.3.2 The Structure of Securitization Vehicles
Some of the details of the structure of credit-card securitization SPVs
are important for the subsequent empirical work. These details are brieﬂy
reviewed in this section.
Trusts—Master Trusts
Securitization SPVs are invariably trusts. The sponsor transfers receiv-
ables to the trust for the beneﬁt of the certiﬁcate holders, that is, the in-
vestors in the SPV. Most trusts are Master Trusts, which allow for repeated
transfers of new receivables, whenever the sponsor chooses.13 At each such
instance, the trust issues a series of securities (trust certiﬁcates) to investors
in the capital markets. Each series has an undivided interest in the assets
and an allocable interest in the collections of the receivables in the master
trust, based on the size of each series. Trust assets that have not been allo-
cated to a series are called the “seller’s interest,” discussed in the following
section. See Schwarcz (2003b).
Master trusts can be “socialized” or “nonsocialized,” two categories
that generally refer to how the SPV waterfall works; that is, how the re-
ceivables’ cash ﬂows are internally allocated. In nonsocialized trusts there
is no reallocation of excess cash ﬂow until each series is paid its full
amount. Socialized trusts pay the trust’s expenses, including the monthly
interest to investors, based on the needs of individualized series. Generally,
the socialized excess spread is socialized across all SPV notes issued by the
trust. This means that should there be an early amortization event (dis-
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13. A “discrete trust” is an SPV used for a single initial transfer of assets.
Fig. 12.4 Asset-backed commercial paper conduits
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (http://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/cp/histouts.txt).cussed subsequently), then all the notes go into early amortization. In a
nonsocialized trust, the notes have their own separate excess spreads. See
Standard and Poor’s (n.d.) for details.
Seller’s Interest
The “seller’s interest” refers to the sponsor’s ownership of trust assets
that have not been allocated to any series of securities issued by the trust.
The size of the seller’s interest varies through time as the amounts of secu-
rities issued by the SPV changes and as the balance of principal receivables
in the trust assets changes. The seller’s interest is usually initially set at 7
percent.
Excess Spread and Early Amortization
A general feature of asset-backed securities is that they involve “excess
spread.” The yield on the underlying loans that is paid into the trust should
be high enough to cover the payment of interest on the ABS tranches in ad-
dition to the servicing fees. Excess spread is generally deﬁned as ﬁnance
charges collections (i.e., the gross yield on the underlying receivables) mi-
nus certiﬁcate interest (paid to the holders of the SPV debt), servicing fees
(paid to the servicer of the receivables, usually the sponsor), and charge-
oﬀs (due to default by the underlying borrowers) allocated to the series. For
example:
Gross yield on portfolio 18%




Depending on the structure of the SPV, available excess spread may be
shared with other series in the Master Trust, used to pay credit enhancers,
deposited into a reserve account to be used to cover charge-oﬀs, or released
to the sponsor.
Practitioners view the excess spread as providing a rough indication of
the ﬁnancial health of a transaction. Excess spread is in fact highly persis-
tent and consequently can be used as a way to monitor a transaction.
All credit card structures have a series of early amortization triggers,
which, if hit, cause the payments to investors to be deﬁned as principal, so
that the SPVs’ liabilities are paid oﬀ early—that is, before the scheduled
payment date. Early amortization events include insolvency of the origi-
nator of the receivables, breaches of representations or warranties, a ser-
vice default, failure to add receivables as required, and others. Most im-
portantly, however, a transaction will amortize early if the monthly excess
spread falls to zero or below for three consecutive months.
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In the most common securitization structure the SPV issues tranches of
securities to the capital markets based on seniority. There are senior notes,
called A notes, and junior or mezzanine notes, called B notes. A common
form of credit enhancement to the more senior classes, A notes and B
notes, is a subordinated interest known as the collateral invested amount
(CIA). The most subordinated interest is referred to by a number of diﬀer-
ent names, including the C class, C note, or collateral interest.14 As men-
tioned, C notes are typically privately placed. This is partly because they
are riskier, but also because they do not qualify as debt for tax purposes,
making them ERISA-ineligible. Because they are privately placed, they are
not rated, and much less information is available about them. See Moody’s
(November 11, 1994) on C notes.
Credit enhancement for the CIA is a reserve account, which grows de-
pending on the level of the excess spread. If the excess spread is low, then
excess spread is trapped inside the SPV and is used to build up the reserve
account to a speciﬁed level. Reserve account structures vary, with diﬀerent
structures having diﬀerent amounts of excess spread trapped inside the
trust, depending on diﬀerent contingencies. If the excess spread is negative,
the reserve account is drawn down to make up the shortfall.
12.3.3 Implicit Recourse
There are examples of recourse in credit card securitizations that are
known publicly. Moody’s (January 1997) gives fourteen examples of “no-
table instances” of voluntary support. The earliest example is from May
1989 and the latest is from November 1996. Higgins and Mason (2004)
study a sample of seventeen implicit recourse events involving ten banks
during the period 1987 to 2001.15 They document that ﬁrms that engage in
subsidization of their SPVs face long delays before returning to market.
12.4 A Theoretical Analysis of SPVs
In this section we analyze a simple model of oﬀ–balance sheet ﬁnancing,
a game played between a representative ﬁrm (the sponsor of the SPV) and
a large number of investors. The goal is to understand the source of value
in the use of SPVs.
For concreteness we call the sponsoring ﬁrm a bank, by which we mean
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14. Prior to the development and widespread use of CIAs, credit card transactions em-
ployed letters of credit (LOCs) from highly rated institutions to protect investors against de-
fault. CIAs became prevalent as a way to avoid dependency on the LOC issuer’s credit quality.
15. Higgins and Mason (2004) report two instances of early amortization during 1987–
2001, both associated with the failure of the sponsoring institution, namely, Republic Bank
and Southeast Bank.any ﬁnancial intermediary or, indeed, any ﬁrm. We proceed by ﬁrst setting
out a model of the bank ﬁnancing a portfolio of two projects in a one-
period setting. The bank’s eﬀorts determine the quality of the projects, un-
beknownst to the lenders to the bank. Project quality is implicitly deter-
mined by various activities of banks, including information production,
screening, and monitoring, but for simplicity it is modeled as an “eﬀort”
choice by the bank.16 This provides a benchmark against which we can de-
termine the value of securitization in the one-period setting.
We will subsequently allow for the possibility of securitization, where
one project may be ﬁnanced oﬀ–balance sheet in an SPV. The timing is as
follows: projects are allocated to be ﬁnanced on– or oﬀ–balance sheet, and
then the bank makes a single eﬀort choice that determines the quality of
both the on– and oﬀ–balance sheet projects (though, ex post, their realized
qualities can diﬀer). To emphasize, projects are allocated ﬁrst, and then
project quality is realized. So, the focus at this point is on the moral hazard
problem involving eﬀort choice, rather than on the strategic allocation of
projects after their qualities are known (i.e., the adverse selection problem).
By comparing the value of the bank when securitization is allowed to the
benchmark bank value when there is no securitization, we determine the
factors causing securitization to be valuable.
Finally, we will allow for strategic allocation of the two projects; that is,
projects are allocated between the balance sheet of the bank and the bal-
ance sheet of the SPV after their qualities are known. The possibility of
strategic allocation of projects adds an additional problem that investors
must be concerned about. In this setting, the bank cannot commit to allo-
cate a high-type project to the SPV. In the credit card case there are some
constraints on the lemons problem because accounts to be sold to the trust
are supposed to be chosen randomly. In this case, the adverse selection may
have more to do with the timing of the addition of accounts, depending on
the state of the on–balance sheet assets, or perhaps with the removal of ac-
counts.17
Without the ability to commit to transfer a high-quality project to the
SPV, we show that no lender will lend to the SPV. Oﬀ–balance sheet ﬁ-
nancing, or securitization, in this setting is not possible. This sets the stage
for the repeated SPV game, analyzed brieﬂy in the ﬁnal part of this section.
The point there is that repetition of the stage game between the bank and
the outside investors can create equilibria in which an implicit contractual
arrangement involving bailouts of the SPV by the sponsoring bank can be
enforced. By “bailouts” we mean extracontractual support for the SPV, as
will become clear later.
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16. See Gorton and Winton (2003) for a review of the literature on banks’ information pro-
duction, screening, and monitoring activities.
17. Also, sometimes sponsors add “high quality” accounts to improve the overall quality of
the receivables pool.12.4.1 Model Set-Up
A competitive bank seeks to ﬁnance two one-period nondivisible proj-
ects. Each project requires $1 of investment. The bank has an amount 
$E   2 available to ﬁnance the two projects. Since E   2, the bank must
borrow D 2 – E, promising to repay Fat the end of the period. Debt, how-
ever, is tax advantaged, so only (1 –  )F needs to be repaid, where   is the
relevant tax rate. The interest rate in the economy, r, is assumed to be zero
for simplicity.
We analyze a representative bank and a unit interval of investors. All
agents, that is, the banks and the investors, are risk-neutral. Consumption
occurs at the end of the period.
The bank determines the quality of its projects by expending “eﬀort,”
e ∈ (eH, eL), where eH   eL, and such that a project returns yH with proba-
bility e and yL with probability (1 – e), where yH   yL. The single eﬀort
choice determines the qualities of both projects, but project realizations
are independent. Thus, there are four possible outcomes or states of the
world at the end of the period: (yH, yH), (yH, yL), (yL, yH), and (yL, yL). The
single eﬀort costs h(e). “Eﬀort” is to be interpreted as the resources neces-
sary to produce information about a project and to monitor it. Eﬀort is not
contractible.
Projects satisfy the following assumptions:
A1. 2(eHyH   [1 – eH]yL) – h(eH)   D; that is, a project is a positive net
present value investment when a high eﬀort level is chosen, such that e  
eH.
A2. 2(eLyH   [1 – eL]yL) – h(eL)   D; that is, a project is a negative net
present value investment when a low eﬀort level is chosen, such that e eL.
A3. 2yL – h(e)   F, for e ∈ (eH, eL); that is, default is certain if each proj-
ect returns yL (state [yL, yL]).
A4. 2yH – h(e)   yH   yL – h(e)   F, for e ∈ (eH, eL); that is, default does
not occur in the other states.
Assumption A1 ensures that investors will only invest if they are sure
that the bank will make a high-eﬀort choice. A project is not worth under-
taking otherwise. Below, the incentive compatibility constraints ensure
that banks will make the high-eﬀort choice. Assumptions A3 and A4 are
stated in terms of the face value of the debt, F, which is an endogenous vari-
able. Nevertheless, the point of A3 and A4 is to determine the states of the
world when default occurs. Default occurs only in the state (yL, yL). We
will subsequently solve for the equilibrium F under this assumption and
then verify that this value of F is consistent with assumptions A3 and A4
when F is eliminated through substitution; the assumptions can then be
stated entirely in terms of primitives.
Corporations face a proportional bankruptcy cost, proportional to the
Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization 567realized output. In other words, larger ﬁrms have higher bankruptcy costs.
This cost is borne by the creditors. Making the bankruptcy cost propor-
tional, rather than lump sum, is both realistic and also simpliﬁes the
model, as will become clear subsequently. The bankruptcy cost is c ∈ (0,1)
per unit of output. A ﬁxed bankruptcy cost could be added to this, though
with binomial outcomes it has no additional content. The bankruptcy cost
is subsequently discussed further.
On–balance sheet debt has a tax advantage. Oﬀ–balance sheet debt usu-
ally does not have this advantage. Here the cost of using oﬀ–balance sheet
debt is the loss of the tax shield to the sponsoring ﬁrm. The sponsor may
structure the SPV so that this cost does not exist. In that case, we would
point to other costs. In general, some limit to how much can be ﬁnanced
oﬀ–balance sheet is needed for there to be an interior solution. However,
recent whole-ﬁrm securitizations suggest that there may be few limits (see
Pﬁster 2000).
12.4.2 Discussion of the Model
The model provides a role for the bank; it has the unique ability to ﬁnd
high-quality projects by making an eﬀort. However, this value production
is not observable to outside investors, since they cannot conﬁrm the eﬀort
level chosen by the bank. This is essentially the usual model of bank activ-
ity. We assume that the bank issues debt to outside investors, and do not
explain why debt is the security of choice. Any ﬁrm transferring assets oﬀ–
balance sheet has created assets of a certain value, which may not be
known to outside investors, so the “bank” need not literally be interpreted
to exclude nonﬁnancial ﬁrms.
12.4.3 The Benchmark Case of No Securitization
We begin with the benchmark problem of the bank when there is no oﬀ–
blaance securitization. In that case, the bank’s problem is to choose F and
e ∈ (eH, eL) to maximize the expected value of its projects:
max: V   e2[2yH   h(e)   (1    )F] 
  2e(1   e)[yH   yL   h(e)   (1    )F] (Problem [1])
subject to: (1) E(F)   D (Participation of Investors)
(2) V(e   eH; e0  eH)   V(e   eL; e0   eH)
(ii) (Incentive Compatibility)
The ﬁrst constraint says that the expected pay-oﬀ to the investors who
purchase the bank debt, E(F), must be at least what was lent (D)—other-
wise, the risk-neutral investors will not lend to the bank (since the interest
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believing that the bank will choose eﬀort level eH, where e0 is the belief of
the lenders regarding the bank’s eﬀort choice, then the bank behaves con-
sistently with these beliefs, choosing e   eH.
The optimization problem is written assuming that the bank defaults
only in state (yL, yL), as assumed by A3 and A4.
Note that the Participation Constraint can be written as follows, since
investors get only the remaining cash ﬂows net of the bankruptcy and eﬀort
costs:
[e2   2e(1   e)]F   (1   e)2[2yL(1   c)   h(e)]   D
Suppose investors’ beliefs about the bank’s eﬀort choice are e   e0. Then
the lowest promised repayment amount that lenders will accept, in order to
lend, is
F0   .
Substituting this into the bank’s problem, the bank’s problem is now to
choose e ∈ (eH, eL) to:
max V   2eyH   2e(1   e)yL   e(2   e)h(e)   (1    )e(2   e)
   
subject to: (ii) V(e   eH; e0   eH)   V(e   eL; e0   eH)
(Incentive Compatibility)
Incentive compatibility requires that the bank’s choice of e∈(eH, eL) be the
same as what the lenders believe it will be, namely e0. Suppose that beliefs
are consistent; that is, that e   e0   eH. Then, indicating bank value by VH,
we have:
(1) VH   2eHyH   2eH(1   eH)yL   eH(2   eH)h(eH) 
  (1    ){D   (1   eH)2[2yL(1   c)   h(eH)]}
If beliefs were inconsistent, that is, if lenders’ beliefs were e0   eH but the
bank chose e   eL, then the value of the bank would be given by:
V(e   eL; e0   eH)   2eLyH   2eL(1   eL)yL   eL(2   eL)h(eL) 
  (1    )eL(2   eL)  
D   (1   eH)2[2yL(1   c)   h(eH)]
    
eH(2   eH)
D   (1   e0)2[2yL(1   c)   h(e0)
    
e0(2   e0)
D   (1   e0)2[2yL(1   c)   h(e0)]
    
e0(2   e0)
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2yH(eH eL)  2yL[eH(1 eH) eL(1 eL)] h(eH)eH(2 eH) h(eL)eL(2 eL) 
  (1    ){D   (1   eH)2[2yL(1   c)   h(eH)]} 1       0,
then at the optimum, investors believe e0 eHand the bank chooses e eH.
The value of the bank is given by equation (1).
Proof: The incentive compatibility constraint, V(e   eH; e0   eH)   V(e
  eL; e0   eH), is satisﬁed if the condition in the lemma holds. It remains to
verify that the equilibrium Fderived under A3 and A4 is consistent, that is,
to state A3 and A4 in terms of primitives. That is left to the appendix.
In what follows we will refer to VH as the value of the bank when there is
no securitization. This will be the benchmark value against which the value
of the bank with securitization will be compared.
12.4.4 Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization
Now, suppose the bank sets up an SPV to ﬁnance one of the projects.
One project will be ﬁnanced on–balance sheet, and one will be ﬁnanced
oﬀ–balance sheet.18 The SPV has no bankruptcy costs, as discussed pre-
viously, and its debt has no tax advantage. As before, the eﬀort choice is
made at the bank level and determines the qualities of both projects,
though the outcomes are independent.19 To be clear, the projects are ﬁrst
allocated to be on– or oﬀ–balance sheet, and then the bank makes its eﬀort
choice.
On–balance sheet, the bank will borrow 0.5D, promising to repay FB at
the end of the period. Oﬀ–balance sheet, the SPV will borrow 0.5D, prom-
ising to repay FS at the end of the period.20 The bank then has two assets
on–balance sheet: its own project and an equity claim on the SPV—that is,
if y is the realization of the SPV’s project, then the bank’s equity claim on
the SPV at the end of the period is max(y – FS, 0).21
eL(2   eL)
  
eH(2   eH)
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18. This assumption is made for simplicity. The model does not determine the scale of the
SPV.
19. Note that no eﬀort choice can be made by the SPV, as it is passive. If the eﬀort choice
could be made at that level, the entity would be a subsidiary of the bank, rather than an SPV.
20. For simplicity, other ﬁnancing choices are assumed to not be available. While we do not
model tranching, it is not inconsistent with the model to allow for additional motivations for
securitization beyond those we consider, such as clientele eﬀects (e.g., perhaps due to eligibil-
ity requirements of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act [ERISA]).
21. Strictly speaking there is an intermediate step, because the bank funds both projects ini-
tially on–balance sheet and then transfers one, in a true sale, to the SPV. We assume that the
proceeds from selling the project to the SPV are used to pay down on–balance sheet debt. For
simplicity, this step is omitted.Assumptions analogous to A3 and A4 deﬁne the bankruptcy states:
A3a. 2yL – h(e)   FB   FS, for e ∈ (eH, eL); that is, default of both the
bank and the SPV occurs if the realized state of the world is (yL, yL).
A4a. 2yH– h(e)  yH yL– h(e)  FB FS, for e∈(eH, eL); that is, there
need not be default of either entity in the other states.
As before, assumptions A3a and A4a are stated in terms of FB and FS, en-
dogenous variables. Assumption A3a determines the states of the world
when default deﬁnitely will occur, namely, in state (yL, yL). Assumption
A4a states that the two projects generate suﬃcient payoﬀs in the other
states to avoid bankruptcy, though whether that is the outcome will depend
on the relationship between the bank and the SPV. We will subsequently
solve for the equilibrium FB and FS under these assumptions and then ver-
ify that those values of FBand FSare consistent with assumptions A3a and
A4a when F is eliminated through substitution; the assumptions can then
be stated entirely in terms of primitives.
We also now assume:
A5. (1 – eH)2yL(1 – c)   0.5D; that is, the expected return for the bank,
from the on–balance sheet project in the bankruptcy state (yL, yL), which
occurs with probability [1 – eH]2, is insuﬃcient to pay 0.5D, the amount
borrowed.
At the end of the period, by A3a and A4a, the possible outcomes are as
follows, where the ﬁrst element is the on–balance sheet project state real-
ization and the second element is the oﬀ–balance sheet project state reali-
zation:
• (yH, yH): Both projects realize yH, this occurs with probability e2, e ∈
(eH, eL). In this event, both on– and oﬀ–balance sheet debts can be re-
paid in full.
• (yH, yL): The on–balance sheet project realizes yH, and the SPV’s proj-
ect is worth yL. This occurs with probability e(1 – e), e ∈ (eH, eL). The
bank is solvent, but the SPV defaults on its debt.
• (yL, yH): The oﬀ–balance sheet project realizes yH, but the bank’s proj-
ect is worth yL. This occurs with probability e(1 – e), e ∈ (eH, eL). The
SPV can honor its debt, and so can the bank, because the bank is the
equity holder of the SPV.
• (yL, yL): Both projects realize yL; this occurs with probability (1 – e)2,
e ∈ (eH, eL). Neither the bank nor the SPV can honor their debt.
Note that with or without securitization, the bank fails only if the real-
ized state is (yL, yL). Consequently, with only two states a lump-sum bank-
ruptcy cost would always be borne in this, and only this, state. This is due
to the simplicity of the model. However, the proportional bankruptcy cost
Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization 571will be aﬀected by securitization, since the on–balance sheet assets have
been reduced to one project. In a more complicated model, with a contin-
uous range of project realizations, a ﬁxed bankruptcy cost could be borne
as a function of the bank’s leverage, which could be chosen endogenously.
Here, the simplicity of the model dictates use of a proportional bankruptcy
cost. But clearly this is not essential for the main point.
The bank’s problem is to choose FB, FS, and e ∈ (eH, eL) to:
max VS   e2[2yH   h(e)   (1    )FB   FS] 
  e(1   e)[yL   yH   h(e)   (1    )FB   FS] 
  e(1   e)[yH   h(e)   (1    )FB) (Problem [II])
subject to (i)ii E(FB)   0.5D (Participation of Investors in the Bank)
(ii)i E(FS)   0.5D (Participation of Investors in the SPV)
(iii) VS(e   eH; e0   eH)   VS(e   eL; e0   eH)
(Incentive Compatibility)
The solution method for Problem (II) is analogous to that for Problem (I),
and so is left to the appendix, including a lemma (Lemma 2) that is analo-
gous to Lemma 1. We refer to VS as the resulting value of the bank with se-
curitization. We now state:
Proposition 1 (Feasibility of Securitization): If (1 – eH)2yLc –  (0.5D – 
[1 – eH]2yL[1 – c])   0, then it is optimal for the bank to use the SPV to ﬁ-
nance one project.
Proof: The condition in the proposition is a simpliﬁcation of VS – VH
  0.
The factors that eﬀect the proﬁtability of securitization are taxes ( ), the
bankruptcy cost (c), and risk, as measured by (1 – eH)2, that is, the chance
of bankruptcy occurring. Taxes matter, to the extent that bankruptcy does
not occur, because debt issued by the SPV is not tax advantaged (by as-
sumption). The bankruptcy cost matters because expected bankruptcy
costs are reduced to the extent that projects are ﬁnanced oﬀ–balance sheet.
This is due to the legal structure of the SPV. Finally, the risk of bankruptcy,
(1 – eH)2, makes the chance of incurring the bankruptcy cost higher.
Corollary 1: The proﬁtability of oﬀ–balance sheet ﬁnancing is increas-
ing in the bankruptcy cost, c, decreasing in the tax rate,  , and increasing in
the riskiness of the project (i.e., the chance of bankruptcy), (1 – eH)2.
Proof: The derivatives of VS – VH with respect to c,  , and (1 – eH)2, re-
spectively, are:
572 Gary B. Gorton and Nicholas S. Souleles   [0.5D   (1   eH)2yL(1   c)]   0, by A5.
  (1   eH)2yL(1    )   0.
  (1    )cyL    yL   0.
Corollary 1 identiﬁes the basic drivers of SPV value, under the assumption
that the projects are allocated to on– or oﬀ–balance sheet before their qual-
ity is known, that is, there is no adverse selection.
12.4.5 Securitization with Moral Hazard 
and Strategic Adverse Selection
Now, suppose that the bank makes an eﬀort choice, that is, e ∈ (eH, eL),
but then afterobserving the realized project qualities, one of the projects is
allocated to the SPV. Recall that project quality is not veriﬁable. This
means that investors in the debt issued by the SPV face an additional prob-
lem. In addition to the moral hazard associated with the eﬀort choice, there
is an adverse selection problem with regard to which project is allocated to
the SPV—the strategic adverse selection problem.
For this subsection we will also assume:
A6. eH
2yH   (1   eH
2)yL   0.5D
The meaning of A6 will become clear shortly.
With the possibility of strategic adverse selection, at the end of the pe-
riod the possible outcomes (following A3a and A4a) are as follows.
• (yH, yH): Both projects realize yH; this occurs with probability e2. The
bank allocates one of the yH projects to the SPV and retains the other
one on–balance sheet. Both on– and oﬀ–balance sheet debts can be re-
paid in full.
• (yH, yL) and (yL, yH): The realization of projects is: one yH and one yL.
This occurs with probability 2e(1 – e). In both of these states of the world,
the bank keeps the yHproject on–balance sheet and allocates the yLproj-
ect to the SPV. The bank is solvent, but the SPV defaults on its debt.
• (yL, yL): Both projects realize yL; this occurs with probability (1 – e)2.
One of the yL projects is allocated to the SPV and the bank retains the
other on–balance sheet. Neither the bank nor the SPV can honor its
debt.
In the previous subsection the SPV failed in two states of the world, the
two situations where it realized yL. Now, the SPV fails in three states of the
∂(VS   VH)
  
∂(1   eH)2
∂(VS   VH)
  
∂c
∂(VS   VH)
  
∂ 
Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization 573world, due to the strategic adverse selection problem. Only if (yH, yH) is re-
alized will the SPV be solvent. So, the expected income of the SPV is: e2yH
  (2e[1 – e]   [1 – e]2)yL   e2yH   (1 – e2)yL. But this is less than 0.5D, by
A6. Consequently, no investor will lend to the SPV. Recognizing this prob-
lem, the bank would like to commit to not engage in strategic adverse se-
lection; the bank would like to commit to allocate projects prior to the re-
alization of the project outcome. But there is no way to do this, because
project quality is not veriﬁable.
Imagine for a moment that the bank could commit to subsidize the SPV
in the event that the SPV realized yL and the bank realized yH. Shortly, we
will make clear what “subsidize” means. Let FSC be the face value of the
debt issued by the SPV under such commitment, and FCthe corresponding
face value of the debt issued by the bank. Then at the end of the period, the
possible outcomes would be as follows:
• (yH, yH): Both projects realize yH; this occurs with probability e2. Both
on– and oﬀ–balance sheet debts can be repaid in full. The expected
proﬁt to the bank in this case is
e2[2yH   h(e)   (1    )FC   FSC].
• (yH, yL): The bank’s project is worth yHand the SPV’s is worth yL. This
occurs with probability e(1 – e). The bank is solvent and subsidizes the
SPV, so that neither defaults on its debt. “Subsidize” means that the
bank assumes responsibility for the debt of the SPV. The bank’s ex-
pected proﬁt in this state of the world is
e(1   e)[yH   yL   h(e)   (1    )FC   FSC].
• (yL, yH): The bank’s project is worth yLand the SPV’s is worth yH. This
occurs with probability e(1 – e). The SPV is solvent. Without the re-
turn on its SPV equity the bank would be insolvent. But the SPV has
done well, so that neither defaults on its debt. The expected proﬁt in
this case is the same as in the previous case, though the interpretation
is diﬀerent:
e(1   e)[yH   yL   h(e)   (1    )FC   FSC].
• (yL, yL): Both projects realize yL; this occurs with probability (1 – e)2.
Neither the bank nor the SPV can honor its debt. The bank earns zero.
With this commitment, the bank’s problem is to choose FC, FSC, and e ∈
(eH, eL) to
max VC   e2[2yH   h(e)   (1    )FC   F SC] 
  2e(1   e)[yH   yL   h(e)   (1    )FC   FSC] (Problem [III])
574 Gary B. Gorton and Nicholas S. Soulelessubject to (i)ii E(FC)   0.5D (Participation of Bank Investors)
(ii)i E(FSC)   0.5D (Participation of SPV Investors)
(iii) VC(e   eH; e0  eH)   VC(e   eL; e0   eH)
(Incentive Compatibility)
Constraints (i) and (ii) can be rewritten, respectively, as
e(2   e)FC   (1   e)2[yL(1   c)   h(e)]   0.5D,
and
e(2   e)FSC   (1   e)2yL   0.5D.
The solution to Problem (III) is contained in the appendix, including a
lemma (Lemma 3) that is analogous to Lemma 1. We refer to VC as the re-
sulting value of the bank with commitment. We now state:
Proposition2 (Equivalence of Problems II and III): If the bank can com-
mit to subsidize the SPV, then the proﬁtability of the bank is the same as it
would be when projects were allocated between the bank and the SPV prior to
their realizations, that is, when there was no strategic adverse selection.
Proof: It may be veriﬁed that VS   VC.
Intuitively, while the debt is repriced to reﬂect the subsidy from the bank
in the state (yH, yL), there are no eﬀects involving the bankruptcy cost or
taxes. Consequently, the bank’s value is the same as in Problem II, when
projects were allocated between the bank and the SPV prior to their real-
izations.
Proposition 2 states that securitization would be feasible; that is, in-
vestors would lend to the SPV, and that would be proﬁtable for the bank
(under the conditions stated in Proposition 1), if it were possible to over-
come the problem of strategic adverse selection by the bank committing to
subsidize the SPV. However, accounting and regulatory rules prohibit such
a commitment, even if it were possible. That is, a formal contract, which
can be upheld in court and which is consistent with accounting and regu-
latory rules, eﬀectively would not be consistent with the SPV being a
QSPV, and hence the debt would not be oﬀ–balance sheet. The bankruptcy
costs would not be minimized. We now turn to the issue of whether a com-
mitment is implicitly possible in a repeated context.
12.4.6 The Repeated SPV Game: The Implicit Recourse Equilibrium
In any single period, the bank cannot securitize a project because lenders
will not lend to the SPV due to the strategic adverse selection problem. We
now consider an inﬁnite repetition of the one-period problem, where for
Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization 575simplicity we assume that the bank has exactly $E available every period to
finance the two projects.22The one-shot-game outcome of no securitization
can be inﬁnitely repeated, so this is an equilibrium of the repeated game.
However, the idea that repetition can expand the set of equilibria, when
commitment is possible, is familiar from the work of Friedman (1971),
Green and Porter (1984), and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), among oth-
ers. The usual context is oligopolistic competition, where the competing
ﬁrms are incompletely informed about their rivals’ decisions. The ﬁrms
want to collude to maintain oligopolistic proﬁts, but cannot formally com-
mit to do so. Here the context is somewhat diﬀerent. The sponsoring bank
and the investors in the SPV collude in adopting a contractual mechanism
that cannot be written down because of accounting and regulatory rules. In
a sense the two parties are colluding against the accountants and regulators.
We will call such an equilibrium an “Implicit Recourse Equilibrium.”
For this section we will suppose that the interest rate, r, is positive and
constant. This means that everywhere there was a “D” above, it must be re-
placed by (1   r)D, as the risk-neutral investors require that they earn an
expected rate of return of r.
The basic idea of repeating the SPV game is as follows. Suppose in-
vestors believe that the bank will subsidize the SPV in the state (yH, yL),
when the SPV would otherwise default. That is, investors have priced the
debt as FC and FSC, as previously given, and their beliefs are e0  eH. Now,
suppose that the state (yH, yL) occurs, that is, the state of the world where
the bank is supposed to subsidize the SPV. The realized bank proﬁt is sup-
posed to be
yH   yL   h(eH)   (1    )FC   FSC.
But, suppose the bank reneges and leaves the SPV bankrupt with yL – FSC
  0, that is, there is no subsidy. The SPV then defaults on its debt. In that
case, on–balance sheet the bank realizes
yH   h(eH)   (1    )FC.
So, the one-shot gain from reneging on the implicit contract is FSC– yL 0.
Since this is positive, the bank has an incentive to renege. But, in a repeated
setting, investors can punish the bank by not investing in the bank’s SPV in
the future, say for N periods. If the bank cannot securitize again for N pe-
riods, it loses (from Proposition 1):
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22. In other words, we assume that if the bank does well it pays a dividend such that E re-
mains as the equity in the bank. If the bank does poorly, we assume that the bank can obtain
more equity so that again there is E. Obviously, this omits some interesting dynamics about
the bank’s capital ratio and begs the question of the coexistence of outside equity and debt.
These issues are beyond the scope of this paper.∑
N
t 1




 t{(1   eH)2yLc    c(1   eH)2yL    [0.5D   (1   eH)2yL]},
where   is the discount rate. Obviously, the bank will not renege on subsi-
dizing the SPV if the expected present value of the loss is greater than the
one-shot gain to deviating. There are combinations of N and   that will
support the Implicit Recourse Equilibrium. While this is the intuition for
Implicit Recourse Equilibrium, it clearly depends on the beliefs of the in-
vestors and the bank. There may be many such equilibria, with very com-
plicated, history-dependent, punishment strategies.
The idea is for the investors in the SPV to enforce support when needed
by the threat of refusing to invest in SPV debt in the future if the sponsor-
ing ﬁrm deviates from the implicit contract. This means that there is a pun-
ishment period in which investors refuse to invest in SPV debt if the spon-
sor has not supported the SPV in the past. In general, strategies can be path
dependent in complicated ways (see Abreu 1988). However, a simple ap-
proach is to restrict attention to punishments involving playing the no-SPV
stage game equilibrium for some period of time, starting the period after a
deviation has been detected. We adopt this approach and assume investor
and bank beliefs are consistent with this.
For simplicity we will construct a simple example of an Implicit Re-
course Equilibrium. Assume that all agents discount at the rate r, and con-
sider the case where N    . This corresponds to a punishment period of
forever.23 At the start of each period the game proceeds as follows:
1. The bank and the SPV oﬀer debt in the capital markets to investors
with face values of FC and FSC, respectively.
2. Investors choose which type of debt, and how much, to buy.
If investors purchase the SPV debt, then oﬀ–balance sheet ﬁnancing pro-
ceeds. Otherwise, the bank ﬁnances both projects on–balance sheet.
At the end of a period, the state of the world is observed, but cannot be
veriﬁed. If the state of the world is (yH, yL); that is, the on–balance sheet
project returns yH while the oﬀ–balance sheet project returns yL, then the
bank is supposed to subsidize the SPV, as previously described. At the start
of any period, both the banks and investors know all the previous out-
comes.
Consider the following trigger strategy based on investor and bank be-
liefs: if the bank ever does not subsidize the SPV when the state of the world
is (yH, yL), then investors never again invest in the SPV, because they be-
lieve that the sponsor will not support it and hence the promised interest
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23. We do not claim that this is the optimal punishment period.rate, corresponding to FSC, is too low. The bank believes that if it deviates
investors will never again buy its SPV’s debt in the market. Then a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium exists under certain conditions:
Proposition 3 (Existence of the Implicit Recourse Equilibrium): If there
exists an interest rate, 0   r   1,such that the following quadratic inequality
is satisﬁed,
0.5Dr2   r{0.5D[1    eH(2   eH)]   (1   eH)2h(eH)   yLB} 
  0.5D  eH(2   eH)   yLA   0
where A   [(1   eH)2[c    (1   c)]eH(2   eH)    (1   eH)2ceH(2   eH)}
and B   [(1   eH)2(1   c)   eH(2   eH)],
then securitization is feasible and optimal for any bank that would choose
securitization were it able to commit to the policy of subsidization.
Proof: See appendix.
Obviously, other equilibria could exist. But, the point is that there can ex-
ist equilibria where the costs of bankruptcy are avoided by using oﬀ–
balance sheet ﬁnancing.
12.4.7 Summary and Empirical Implications
The conclusion of the previous analysis is that the value of SPVs lies in
their ability to minimize expected bankruptcy costs—securitization arises
to avoid bankruptcy costs. By ﬁnancing the ﬁrm in pieces, control rights to
the business decisions are separated from the ﬁnancing decisions. The
sponsor maintains control over the business while the ﬁnancing is done via
SPVs that are passive; that is, there are no control rights associated with the
SPVs’ assets. Bankruptcy is a process of transferring control rights over
corporate assets. Oﬀ–balance sheet ﬁnancing reduces the amount of assets
that are subject to this expensive and lengthy process.
We have argued that the ability to ﬁnance oﬀ–balance sheet via the debt
of SPVs is critically dependent on a relational, or implicit, contract be-
tween the SPV sponsor and investors. The relational contract depends
upon repeated use of oﬀ–balance sheet ﬁnancing. We showed that this rep-
etition can lead to an equilibrium with implicit recourse. Such an equilib-
rium implements the outcome of the equilibrium with formal commit-
ments (Problem III), were such contracts possible. The comparative static
properties of the Implicit Recourse Equilibrium are based on the result
that the equilibrium outcomes of the Implicit Recourse Equilibrium are
the same as the commitment equilibrium.
The idea of a relational contract supporting the feasibility of SPVs leads
578 Gary B. Gorton and Nicholas S. Soulelesto our ﬁrst set of empirical tests; namely, that the trigger strategy can only
provide intertemporal incentives for the sponsor insofar as the sponsor ex-
ists. If the sponsor is so risky that there is a chance the sponsor will fail and
be unable to support the SPV, then investors will not purchase the SPV
debt. We examine this idea by testing the hypothesis that investors, in pric-
ing the debt of the SPV, care about the risk of the sponsor defaulting, above
and beyond the risks of the SPV’s assets.
The second hypothesis that we empirically investigate is suggested by
Corollary 1. Because the Implicit Recourse Equilibrium implements the
outcome with formal commitment, Corollary 1 also describes the repeated
equilibrium with implicit recourse. Corollary 1 says that the proﬁtability of
oﬀ–balance sheet ﬁnancing is increasing in the bankruptcy cost, c, and
increasing in the riskiness of the project (i.e., the chance of bankruptcy), 
(1 – eH). In other words, riskier sponsors should securitize more, ceteris
paribus. Bankruptcy costs are not observable, but the riskiness of the ﬁrm
can be proxied for by its ﬁrm bond rating.
12.5 Data
The rest of the paper empirically examines these two hypotheses. Our
analysis suggests that the risk of a sponsoring ﬁrm should, because of im-
plicit recourse, aﬀect the risk of the ABS that are issued by its SPVs. We
measure the sponsor’s risk by its bond rating, and focus on two ways that
this risk might be manifested. As mentioned earlier, we ﬁrst consider
whether investors care about the strength of the sponsoring ﬁrm, above
and beyond the characteristics of the ABS themselves. Second, we consider
whether riskier ﬁrms are more likely to securitize in the ﬁrst place. To these
ends we utilize a number of datasets.
To investigate our ﬁrst topic, investors’ sensitivity to the sponsor’s
strength, we obtained from Moody’s a unique dataset describing every
credit card ABS issued between June 1988 and May 1990 that Moody’s
tracked. This covers essentially all credit card ABS through mid 1999. The
dataset includes a detailed summary of the structure of each ABS, includ-
ing the size and maturity of each ABS tranche. It summarizes the credit en-
hancements behind each tranche, such as the existence of any letters of
credit, cash collateral accounts, and reserve accounts. Moody’s also calcu-
lated the amount of direct subordination behind each A and B tranche.24
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24. The amount of subordination behind the A note is calculated as (BalB  BalC)/(BalA  
BalB   BalC), where BalX is the size (the balance) of tranche X when it exists. The dataset
provided the current amount of subordination using current balances. For our following
analysis, we want the original amount of subordination at the time of issuance. We were able
to estimate this given the original balance sizes of the A and B notes, as well as an estimate of
the size of any C note. The size of C notes is not directly publicly available, but we backed out
their current size from the reported current amount of subordination behind the B notes. We
used this to estimate the original amount of subordination behind the A and B notes.These variables contain the information about the ABS structure that in-
vestors observed at the time of issuance. Further, the dataset includes some
information about the asset collateral underlying each ABS, such as the age
distribution of the credit card accounts. Also included is the month-by-
month ex post performance of each note, in particular the excess spread
and its components like the chargeoﬀ rate. The following sample includes
only the A and B tranches, that is, the tranches that were sold publicly.
Although it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd pricing information on credit card ABS,
we obtained from Lehman Brothers a dataset containing the initial yields
on a large subset of these bonds that were issued in 1997–1999, for both the
A and B notes. We obtained similar data from Asset Sales Reports for
bonds that were issued before 1997. We computed the initial spread as the
initial yield minus one month London Interbank Oﬀered Rate (LIBOR) at
the time of issuance. We also collected Moody’s ratings from Bloomberg
for the sponsors of each ABS in the Moody’s dataset, which are typically
banks. We use the bank’s senior unsecured bond rating at issuance.25
To investigate our second topic, an analysis of which banks securitize,
we use the bank entity-level Call Report panel data that comes from the
regulatory ﬁlings that banks ﬁle each quarter, from September 1991 to June
2000. Before 1996 we use only the third quarter (September) data, since
credit card securitizations were reported only in the third quarter during
that period. We also obtained from Moody’s a large dataset of all of their
ratings of banks’ long-term senior obligations, including an identiﬁcation
(ID) variable that allowed us to match this data to the Call Report ID vari-
ables. Accordingly, our sample includes all the banks in the Call Report
dataset for which we have a matching rating.26 This yields a sample of al-
most 400 banks and over 5000 bank-quarters, which is large relative to the
samples analyzed in previous related literature.
12.6 Empirical Tests: Are There Implicit Recourse Commitments?
In this section we analyze the determinants of the spread on the notes is-
sued by the SPVs to the capital markets. Borgman and Flannery (1997)
also analyze asset-backed security spreads, over the period 1990–1995.
They ﬁnd that credit card ABS require a lower market spread if the spon-
soring ﬁrm is a bank or if the sponsor includes guarantees as a form of
credit enhancement.
The unit of observation is a transaction, that is, a note issuance: either
the A note or the B note. We examine the cross-sectional determinants of
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25. We use the rating of the current owner of the ABS trust, accounting for any mergers and
acquisitions.
26. Since small banks are less likely to be rated, matches are most common for the larger
banks.the spreads. The spreads provide us with investors’ assessment of the risk
factors behind each note. All the A notes were on issuance rated AAA by
Moody’s.27 If these ratings are suﬃcient statistics for default, then the
probability of default should be the same for all the A notes, and in the sim-
plest case (e.g., if there is no implicit recourse) presumably investors would
pay the same initial price for them. Even if there are diﬀerences across
notes in the quality of the underlying assets or in other factors, the securi-
tizations should be structured to oﬀset these diﬀerences and yield the same
probability of default. As discussed previously, to test for the existence of
a relational contract allowing for recourse, we examine other factors aﬀect
the initial prices of the notes, in particular whether the strength of the
sponsor matters, as estimated by its senior unsecured credit rating at the
time of issuance. Speciﬁcally, we examine equations of the following form:
(2) Spreadi,j,k,t    0 Timet    1 Structurei    2 Assetsi    3 Trustj
   4 Ratingk,t   εi,j,k,t,
where Spreadi,j,k,t is the initial spread (net of one month LIBOR) on note i
from trust j and sponsor k at the time t of issuance. Time is a vector of year
dummies that control for time-varying risk premia as well as all other
macroeconomic factors, including the tremendous growth in the ABS mar-
ket over the sample period. Structurei represents the structure of tranche i
at the time of issuance, such as the degree of subordination and other credit
enhancements supporting it, and Assetsirepresents the quality of the credit
card assets underlying the tranche at that time. Trustj is a vector of trust
dummies. Ratingk,t is the senior unsecured bond rating of the sponsor k of
the notes’ trust at the time of issuance. The trust dummies control for all
trust ﬁxed eﬀects. Since many sponsors have multiple trusts, the dummies
also essentially control for sponsor ﬁxed eﬀects.28 Given this, the ratings
variable will essentially capture the eﬀect of changes in a sponsor’s rating
over time.29
Our initial sample includes only the A notes, but later we add the B notes,
with Structure then including an indicator for the B notes (Junior). Table
12.2 presents summary statistics for the key variables used in the analysis,
for the sample of A notes. The sample runs from 1988–1999. Over that time
the average A-note spread was just under 50 basis points (b.p.), with a rel-
atively large standard deviation of 68 b.p. About half of the sponsors have
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27. All but two of the B notes were initially rated A; the two exceptions were rated AA. By
distinguishing the A and B notes, the analysis implicitly controls for any clientele eﬀects.
28. Though a given trust can also have multiple owners over time, for example, after a
merger or acquisition.
29. As evidenced by the signiﬁcant results that follow, there is substantial within-trust vari-
ation in both the spreads and ratings over time, with over 30 percent of trusts exhibiting some
change in rating over the sample period.ratings of single A (RatingA) on their senior unsecured debt, with the rest
being about equally likely to have ratings of AA (RatingAA) or ratings of
Baa and Ba (RatingB).
12.6.1 Analysis of the A-Note Spreads
Table 12.3 shows the results for the A notes. Column (1) includes only
the year dummies (omitting 198830) and the sponsor ratings (as well as the
trust ﬁxed eﬀects). Nonetheless, the adjusted R2 is already relatively large.
The year dummies are signiﬁcant, with spreads peaking in the early 1990s,
perhaps due to the recession. The sponsor ratings at the bottom of the table
are of primary interest. Relative to the omitted AA-rated sponsors, the
eﬀects of riskier sponsor ratings are positive and monotonic. The coeﬃ-
cient on RatingB for the riskiest (Baa and Ba) sponsors is statistically sig-
niﬁcant. Thus investors do indeed require higher yields for bonds issued by
the trusts of riskier sponsors. That is, even though the A notes all have the
same bond ratings, the strength of the sponsor also matters, consistent
with our model. This eﬀect is also economically signiﬁcant. The riskiest
sponsors must pay an additional 46 b.p. on average, which is about the same
size as the average A-note spread, and sizable relative to the standard de-
viation of spreads in table 12.2. This is a relatively strong result given the
trust dummies, which control for all average and time-invariant eﬀects. The
variation in a sponsor’s rating over time is suﬃcient to cause signiﬁcant
changes over time in the yields paid by its ABS.
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30. Because of missing values in some of the covariates, some of the time dummies drop out
of the regressions.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.This result could be interpreted as suggesting that, even if the rating
agencies place some weight on the risk of a sponsor in assessing the risk of
their ABS notes, they do not do so fully. But the bond ratings are dis-
cretized, not continuous-valued, so there can be some diﬀerences in risk
even among bonds with the same ratings. Also, investors’ views of the risk
might not completely coincide with the views of the ratings agencies.
Hence we also directly control for the potential risk factors observable by
investors. The next columns start by adding controls for the structure of the
A notes. Of course, this structure is endogenous (but predetermined by 
the time of issuance) and should itself reﬂect the rating agencies’ view of the
notes’ risk. Recall that the trust dummies already controlled for all time-
invariant trust eﬀects. These dummies are always jointly signiﬁcant (unre-
ported). For instance, some trusts might get locked into an older trust-
structure technology that is considered riskier.
Column (2) explicitly controls for the amount of direct subordination
behind each A note. LowSub is a dummy variable representing the quartile
of notes with the smallest amount of subordination (i.e., the riskiest notes
as measured by the relative size of their “buﬀer,” ceteris paribus). It has a
signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient. Thus, the notes with less enhancement have
to oﬀer investors higher yields to compensate. Nonetheless, the coeﬃcients
on the ratings variables change very little.31 Column (3) adds as a control
the expected maturity of the notes (Maturity). It also adds the size of the
sellers’ interest (SellersInt) and a dummy variable for whether the note is
ﬁxed rate or not (FixedRt). The results indicate that longer maturity and
ﬁxed-rate notes pay signiﬁcantly higher spreads.32Given these controls, the
subordination measure (LowSub) becomes insigniﬁcant. This could mean
that the size of the subordination might be a function of, among other
things, maturity and whether the deal is ﬁxed rate. Despite these eﬀects,
again the coeﬃcients on the ratings do not change much. Column (4) con-
trols for additional credit enhancement features, speciﬁcally dummy var-
iables for the presence of a cash collateral account (I_CCA), a letter of
credit (I_LOC), an internal reserve fund (I_RES), or other enhancement
(I_Other). Given the other covariates, these additional enhancements are
individually and jointly insigniﬁcant, though as indicated in table 12.2,
only CCAs are frequently used. But the sponsor ratings remain signiﬁcant.
Finally, column (5) includes measures of the riskiness of the underlying
portfolio of credit card receivables. Again, these are variables that the rat-
ing agencies take into account when approving the bond structure with a
given rating, so their eﬀects could already have been taken into account.
The variable “Seasoned” is an indicator for older portfolios, with an aver-
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31. Since LowSub is often missing, the sample size is smaller than in column (1). Nonethe-
less our subsequent conclusions persist under the larger sample available if we do not control
for LowSub.
32. Moody’s (1995) noted a similar eﬀect of maturity on spreads through 1993.age account age above twenty-four months. Since older accounts tend to
have lower probabilities of default, this should reﬂect a safer portfolio.33
Chargeoﬀ is the initial (ex post) chargeoﬀ rate in the portfolio.34 Both vari-
ables are statistically signiﬁcant, with the intuitive signs. Riskier portfo-
lios, whether unseasoned or with higher chargeoﬀ rates, must pay higher
spreads. While Chargeoﬀ is an ex post chargeoﬀ rate, the conclusions are
the same on instrumenting for it using the balance-weighted average char-
geoﬀ rate in the trust from the month before the issuance of each note in
the sample. Even with these controls, the sponsor’s rating remains signiﬁ-
cant.35
12.6.2 Analysis of the A-Note and B-Note Spreads
Table 12.4 repeats this analysis using both the A and B notes. All re-
gressions now include an indicator variable (Junior) for the B notes. In
column (1), this indicator is signiﬁcantly positive, as expected given the
greater risk of the B notes. They must pay on average 29 b.p. more than the
A notes. The coeﬃcient on the riskiest sponsors, RatingB, remains signiﬁ-
cant and large at 42 b.p. Thus the extra yield that must be paid by risky
sponsors is even larger than the extra yield that must be paid by B notes. In
column (2), LowSub indicates the A notes with the lowest quartile of sub-
ordination, and LowSubJr indicates the B notes with the lowest quartile of
subordination. The latter variable is signiﬁcant (and drives out the direct
eﬀect of the Junior indicator), implying that B notes with less enhancement
must pay higher yields. The rest of the analysis is analogous to that in table
12.3, and the conclusions are the same.
Overall, the estimated eﬀects of the sponsors’ ratings appear to be ro-
bust. Even controlling for the ABS structure and underlying assets, the rat-
ings of the sponsors remain signiﬁcant, both statistically and economically.
This supports our theoretical conclusion that the strength of the sponsor
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33. For an account-level analysis of the determinants of default probabilities, see Gross and
Souleles (2002). For a portfolio-level analysis, see Musto and Souleles (2004). The original age
data reﬂect the age of the accounts across the entire trust as of a given time. To estimate the
age distribution of accounts underlying a given note at the time of issuance, we subtracted the
time since closing. This assumes that the composition of the assets did not change too much
between the time of closing and the time of reporting.
34. We take it from month three after issuance, since the excess spread components are
sometimes missing in months one and two.
35. We also tried various extensions. For instance, we controlled for the importance of (on–
balance sheet) credit card balances and other consumer receivables relative to total assets
(CC/Assets). (When available from “Moody’s Credit Opinions,” CC/Assets is consumer re-
ceivables relative to assets. Otherwise, it is credit card balances relative to total assets from the
Call Report data. In the latter case, in any given year CC/Assets is taken from the September
quarter, and for 1988–90, it is taken from September 1991.) CC/Assets had a signiﬁcant neg-
ative eﬀect on spreads, but did not change the results regarding the ratings. This suggests that
the latter eﬀect might not reﬂect just a correlation between the assets in the trust and the assets
on–balance sheet, since presumably the credit card assets in the trust are more highly corre-








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.matters because of the possibility of implicit recourse commitment. To
reiterate, the trigger strategy at the root of the relational contract concern-
ing recourse requires that the sponsor exist—that is, has not defaulted. The
results are consistent with the investors in the ABS markets pricing the risk
that the sponsor disappears and cannot support its SPVs.
12.7 Empirical Tests: Which Firms Securitize?
In this section we turn to testing whether riskier ﬁrms securitize more
than others. Since our model is, of course, highly stylized, we analyze more
generally the determinants of securitization. We estimate equations of the
following form, using the Call Report panel data from quarters 1991 (Sep-
tember)–2000 (June)
(3) Securitizei,t    0 Timet    1 Banki    2 Xi,t    3 Ratingi,t   ui,t,
where Securitizei,t reﬂects the extent of credit card securitization by bank i
at time t, measured in one of three ways: (1) We start with logit models of
the probability that bank i has securitized, with dependent variable I_Sec
being an indicator for whether the bank has any securitized credit card
loans outstanding at time t (the extensive margin). (2) We also estimate To-
bit models wherein the dependent variable Sec/Assets measures the amount
of these securitizations normalized by total bank assets (including the secu-
ritized loans).36 (3) To distinguish the intensive margin component in (2)
from the extensive margin in (1), we also estimate conditional ordinary least
square (OLS) models of Sec/Assets conditional on Sec/Assets   0.37
The dependent variables again include a full set of time dummies, this
time quarter dummies. Xi,t controls for various bank characteristics over
time. In particular, it includes cubic polynomials in bank i’s total assets, As-
setsi,t, and in its share of credit card balances in total assets, CC/Assetsi,t.
These control for scale eﬀects, including costs that might arise in setting up
and maintaining securitization trusts. We also control for the bank’s capi-
tal ratio (equity capital divided by assets), CapRatioi,t, again using a cubic
polynomial.38 Some speciﬁcations also control for all average and time-
invariant bank eﬀects (Banki), using the corresponding ﬁxed eﬀects esti-
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36. We include the securitized loans in assets in the denominator for convenience in inter-
preting Sec/Assets as a fraction  1. The denominator can also be interpreted as managed as-
sets, although we do not have information on the full extent of oﬀ–balance sheet assets (in-
cluding non-credit card assets) under management. Our conclusions are similar on not
including the securitized loans in the denominator.
37. We would also like to estimate selection models, but we lack persuasive omitted instru-
ments.
38. We did not include the securitized loans (Sec) in assets in the denominator of CC/As-
sets or CapRatio, in order to avoid creating spurious correlations between these variables and
the dependent variables (I_Sec and Sec/Assets). Calomiris and Mason (2004) discuss the re-
lation between securitization and capital ratios.mator. Ratingi,t is the Moody’s rating of a bank’s long-term senior obliga-
tions. Given the bank eﬀects, the ratings variable will capture only within-
bank variation—that is, the eﬀect of changes in a bank’s rating over time
on its propensity to securitize.39
Table 12.5presents summary statistics for the key variables, for the entire
sample period 1991–2000. To highlight the changes in the credit card ABS
market over time, the second panel shows the same statistics for the end of
the sample period (the ﬁrst half of 2000). Comparing the panels shows the
large growth in the market over the period. The fraction of banks that se-
curitized (I_Sec) increased from about 8 percent in the early- to mid-1990s
to 15 percent at the end of the sample period, averaging about 11 percent
overall during the period. The magnitude of securitizations relative to as-
sets (Sec/Assets) increased from about 1.6 percent to 4.1 percent over the
sample period, averaging 3.3 percent. The average bank rating declined
over the sample period, though this happened for both the banks that se-
curitized and those that did not.
Further, at any given time there is substantial cross-sectional variation
across banks in the incidence and amount of securitization and in their rat-
ings. The raw data suggest potential scale eﬀects, with the big securitizers
often being the bigger banks. These include highly rated securitizers, such
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39. The sample drops the few bank observations (about 10 banks) rated C and single B.
Most of these were small banks in the early 1990s that did not securitize (only one of these
banks securitized). As a result, they tended to be automatically dropped from the ﬁxed-eﬀects
estimation (or otherwise, their eﬀect was imprecisely estimated due to their small sample
size).
Table 12.5 Sponsor ratings and the propensity to securitize: Summary statistics
1991–2000 2000
Standard Standard
Mean deviation Mean deviation
I_Sec 0.113 0.317 0.146 0.317
Sec/Assets 0.033 0.124 0.041 0.124
RatingAA 0.462 0.499 0.474 0.499
RatingA 0.446 0.497 0.397 0.497
RatingB 0.092 0.289 0.129 0.289
Assets (mil $) 16.0 39.1 25.4 39.1
CC/Assets 0.050 0.178 0.038 0.178
CapRatio 0.086 0.036 0.086 0.034
No. of observations 5,012 363
Notes: The ﬁrst sample is that for table 12.6, columns (1) and (2), averaging over Call Report
Data quarters September 1991–June 2000. The second sample averages over only March 2000
and June 2000. See table 12.6 and text for variable deﬁnitions.as Citibank NV with an AA rating and Sec/Assets averaging about 71 per-
cent. By contrast ﬁrms like Advanta (Sec/Assets   70 percent), Capital
One (  57 percent), and Colonial (  65 percent) have lower ratings (Rat-
ingB). Given the potential problem of unobserved heterogeneity, our ﬁxed-
eﬀects estimators forego exploiting the purely cross-sectional average
diﬀerence across banks; instead they set a high standard by relying on the
more limited, but still substantial, within-bank variation over time in the
incidence and amount of securitization and in the ratings. For instance,
many banks were downgraded or upgraded at various times. Also, some
banks securitized in only a few years (perhaps just trying it out), whereas
others securitized frequently but in varying amounts over time.
The main results are in table 12.6. Column (1) begins with a logit model
of the probability of securitizing (I_Sec), without bank eﬀects. The eﬀects
of total assets (Assets), the importance of credit card assets (CC/Assets),
and the capital ratio (CapRatio) are each jointly signiﬁcant. Given the
other covariates, in this speciﬁcation the probability of securitizing is not
monotonic in Assets; after initially increasing with Assets, it later declines.
The probability of securitizing generally increases with CC/Assets (though
declines a bit as CC/Assets gets very large). This could mean that having a
large portfolio of credit cards provides economies of scale in securitizing.
Also, the probability of securitizing is not monotonic in CapRatio (but in-
creases for large CapRatio).
Of primary interest, listed at the bottom of the table, in this ﬁrst speciﬁ-
cation the banks’ ratings have a statistically signiﬁcant, though nonmo-
notonic, eﬀect. Relative to the omitted AA ratings, the middle (RatingA)
banks are somewhat less likely to securitize. Nonetheless, the riskiest (Rat-
ingB) are indeed much more likely to securitize.
Column (2) estimates a Tobit model of the amount of securitization (Sec/
Assets). The conclusions are similar to those in the previous column. In
both of these speciﬁcations, and those that follow, the pseudo and adjusted
R2 statistics are relatively large.
The remaining columns control for bank ﬁxed eﬀects. Column (3) uses
the ﬁxed eﬀects logit estimator. Note that as a result the sample size sig-
niﬁcantly declines, since this estimator drops banks for which I_Sec does
not vary over time. Now the eﬀect of Assets is monotonically increasing,
though CC/Assets is less monotonic and CapRatio becomes insigniﬁcant.
More importantly, both RatingA and RatingB have signiﬁcant positive
eﬀects, with a larger eﬀect for the latter. Thus these results suggest that the
probability of securitizing does indeed increase monotonically with banks’
riskiness, consistent with our model. Column (4) focuses instead on the
intensive margin, estimating a conditional OLS model of the fraction of
securitized assets conditional on Sec/Assets   0. CapRatio now has a mo-
notonically increasing eﬀect, though Assets has a negative eﬀect on the

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.intensive margin, and CC/Assets is not monotonic. While RatingA is pos-
itive but insigniﬁcant, RatingB has a larger positive coeﬃcient, signiﬁcant
at the 6 percent level. Relative to banks with AA ratings, those with B rat-
ings have about a 3.4 percentage point (p.p.) larger securitization fraction,
on average. This is an economically signiﬁcant eﬀect, given that it is com-
parable in magnitude to the average Sec/Assets fraction of about 3.3 p.p.
Overall, we conclude that there is some evidence that riskier ﬁrms are
more likely to securitize—consistent with our model—though the eﬀect is
not always monotonic, depending on the speciﬁcation. The eﬀects of As-
sets, CC/Assets, and CapRatio are more sensitive to the speciﬁcation.40
12.7.1 Summary
The empirical results are consistent with the proposed theory, namely
that an implicit contractual relationship between SPV sponsors and capi-
tal markets investors reduces bankruptcy costs. Consistent with the pre-
diction that in the Implicit Recourse Equilibrium investors would price the
risk of the sponsor defaulting, and hence being unable to subsidize the
SPV, we found that the risk of the sponsor (as measured by the sponsor’s
bond rating) was consistently signiﬁcant. The prediction of the model that
ﬁrms with high expected bankruptcy costs would be the largest users of
oﬀ–balance sheet ﬁnancing was also generally conﬁrmed.
12.8 Conclusion
Oﬀ–balance sheet ﬁnancing is a pervasive phenomenon. It allows spon-
soring ﬁrms to ﬁnance themselves by separating control rights over assets
from ﬁnancing. The operating entity, that is, the sponsoring ﬁrm, main-
tains control rights over the assets that generate cash ﬂows. The assets
(projects) can be ﬁnanced by selling the cash ﬂows to an SPV that has no
need for control rights, because the cash ﬂows have already been con-
tracted for. We have argued that this arrangement is eﬃcient because there
is no need to absorb dead-weight bankruptcy costs with respect to cash
ﬂows that have already been contracted for. Oﬀ–balance sheet ﬁnancing is
about ﬁnancing new projects by using cash ﬂows promised under prior
contracts as collateral. We showed that the eﬃcient use of oﬀ–balance
sheet ﬁnancing is facilitated by an implicit arrangement, or contractual re-
lations, between sponsoring ﬁrms and investors. The empirical tests, uti-
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40. We also tried various extensions. For instance, to see whether the ratings in turn might
reﬂect the amount of securitization, we tried instrumenting for the ratings using lagged rat-
ings. However, it is not clear how long a lag would be best. At the extreme, we used the ratings
from June 1991, the quarter before the sample period starts. Given how small the credit card
ABS market was at the time, it is unlikely that those ratings were signiﬁcantly aﬀected by se-
curitization. The results were generally insigniﬁcant. This is not surprising, however, given the
smaller sample size (since the 1991 ratings are not always available) and reduced amount of
variation.lizing credit card asset-backed securitization as a testing ground, con-




It remains to verify that the equilibrium Fderived under assumptions A3
and A4 is consistent. That is, we now restate assumptions A3 and A4 in
terms of primitives. Recall A3 was stated as: 2yL – h(e)   F. The equilib-
rium F is given by
F   .
Substituting the expression for F into A3 and simplifying gives
2yL[1   c(1   eH)2]   h(eH)   D,
which is A3 stated in terms of primitives and consistent with the equilib-
rium.
Recall A4 was stated as: 2yH – h(e)   yH   yL – h(e)   F. Substitute the
equilibrium value of F into yH   yL – h(e)   F, and simplify to obtain
(eH   1)2yL(1   2c)   h(eH)   D.
Solution to Problem (II)
Note that constraint (i) of Problem (II) in the main text can be written as
e(2   e)FB   (1   e)2[yL(1   c)   h(e)]   0.5D.
Similarly, constraint (ii) of Problem (II) can be written as
eFS   (1   e)yL   0.5D.
As before, suppose lenders’ beliefs are e0. Then investors in the bank and
SPV, respectively, will participate if the promised repayments are at least
F0
B   ,
and
F0
S   .
0.5D   (1   e0)yL
  
e0
0.5D   (1   e0)2[yL(1   c)   h(e0)]
    
e0(2   e0)
D   (1   eH)2[2yL(1   c)   h(eH)]
    
eH(2   eH)
592 Gary B. Gorton and Nicholas S. SoulelesSubstitute these into the bank’s problem. Then the bank’s problem is to
choose e ∈ (eH, eL) to
max VS   2eyH   e(1   e)yL   e(2   e)h(e)   (1    )e(2   e) 
       e  
subject to (iii) VS(e   eH; e0   eH)   VS(e   eL; e0   eH)
(Incentive Compatibility).
Suppose that beliefs are consistent, that is, that e   e0   eH. Then
(4) VS   2eHyH   eH(1   eH)yL   eH(2   eH)h(eH) 
  (1    ){0.5D   (1   eH)2[yL(1   c)   h(eH)]} 
  [0.5D   (1   eH)yL].
Lemma 2: If
2yH(eH   eL)   yL[eH(1   eH)   eL(1   eL)]   h(eH)eH(2   eH) 
  h(eL)eL(2   eL)   (1    ){0.5D   (1   eH)2[yL(1   c)   h(eH)]}
  1       0,
then at the optimum, lenders believe e0 eHand the bank chooses e  eH. The
value of the bank VS is given by equation (4).
Proof: The incentive compatibility constraint, VS(e   eH; e0   eH)  
VS(e   eL; e0   eH), is satisﬁed if the condition in the lemma holds. It re-
mains to verify that the equilibrium FB and FS derived under A3a and A4a
are consistent, that is, to state A3a and A4a in terms of primitives. Recall
A3a: 2yL – h(e)   FB   FS. The equilibrium FB and FS are given by:
FB   ,
and
FS   .
Substituting the expression for FB and FS into A3a and simplifying gives
0.5D   (1   eH)yL
  
eH
0.5D   (1   eH)2[yL(1   c)   h(eH)]
    
eH(2   eH)
eL(2   eL)
  
eH(2   eH)
0.5D   (1   e0)yL
  
e0
0.5D   (1   e0)2[yL(1   c)   h(e0)]
    
e0(2   e0)
Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization 593yL(3   eH)   h(eH)   c(1   eH)2yL   0.5D(3   eH),
which is A3a stated in terms of primitives and consistent with the equilib-
rium.
Recall A4a: 2yH – h(e)   yH   yL – h(e)   FB   FS. Substitute the equi-
librium values of FB and FS into yH   yL – h(e)   F, and simplify to obtain
yHeH(2   eH)   yL(3   3eH   e2
H)   h(eH)   cyL(1   eH)2   0.5D(3   eH),
which is A4a stated in terms of primitives and consistent with the equilib-
rium.
Solution to Problem (III)
In solving Problem (III) we proceed as before and suppose lenders’ be-
liefs are e0. Then lenders will participate in lending to the bank and the





SC   .
Suppose that beliefs are consistent, that is, e   e0   eH. Then
(5) VC   2eHyH   2eH(1   eH)yL   eH(2   eH)h(eH) 
  (1    ){0.5D   (1   eH)2[yL(1   c)   h(eH)]} 
  [0.5D   (1   eH)2yL]
Lemma 3: If
2yH(eH eL)  2yL[eH(1  eH)  eL(1  eL)]  h(eH)eH(2  eH)  h(eL)eL(2  eL) 
  (1    ){0.5D   (1   eH)2[yL(1   c)   h(eH)]} 1    
  [0.5D   (1   eH)2yL] 1       0,
then at the optimum, lenders believe e0 eHand the bank chooses e  eH. The
value of the bank is given by equation (5).
Proof: The incentive compatibility constraint, VC(e   eH; e0   eH)  
VC(e   eL; e0   eH), is satisﬁed if the condition in the lemma holds.
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider a bank that would choose securitization were it able to commit
to subsidize its SPV in the state (yH, yL), as in Problem (III). Also, consider
eL(2   eL)
  
eH(2   eH)
eL(2   eL)
  
eH(2   eH)
0.5D   (1   e0)2yL
  
e0(2   e0)
0.5D  (1   e0)2[yL(1   c)   h(e0)]
    
e0(2   e0)
594 Gary B. Gorton and Nicholas S. Soulelesa date at which the bank has always subsidized its SPV in the past. Over the
next period the bank is worth VC if it securitizes one project oﬀ–balance
sheet and retains the other on–balance sheet. If both projects are ﬁnanced
on–balance sheet, the bank is worth VH. By Propositions 1 and 2, VC VH.
The present value of this diﬀerence is the beneﬁt to the bank of being able
to utilize oﬀ–balance sheet ﬁnancing, assuming that it continues to subsi-
dize its SPV in the state (yH, yL). Over the inﬁnite horizon this annuity
value is: (VC – VH)/r. (Recall that agents discount at rate r.)
At the end of the period, suppose that the state of the world is, in fact,
(yH, yL). Consider a one-shot deviation by the bank. That is, the bank de-
cides not to subsidize the SPV, when investors expect the bank to subsidize
it. From the expressions given above, the beneﬁt to the bank of such a de-
viation is
yH   h(eH)   (1    )FC   yH   yL   h(eH)   (1   c)FC   FSC
which reduces to: FSC – yL.
To decide whether to deviate or not the bank compares the costs and
beneﬁts of deviation and chooses to subsidize the SPV as long as
  FSC   yL.
Substituting in this equation for VC, VH, and FSC and simplifying gives the
quadratic inequality in the proposition.
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Comment Peter Tufano
Gorton and Souleles’ chapter on “Special Purpose Vehicles and Securiti-
zation” sheds light on an important element of the ﬁnancial services world
and highlights the gap between risk transfer on paper and in practice.
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The authors report that nonmortgage securitizations had liabilities of al-
most $1.8 trillion in early 2004, with underlying assets including auto loans,
credit card loans, home equity lines, and collateralized bond obligation/
collateralized debt obligation (CBO/CDO) structures, among others. In
addition, asset-backed commercial paper is perhaps another $0.6 trillion.
The Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data provides even larger estimates.
Liabilities of agency- and government-sponsored entity pools totaled over
$3.5 billion in Q12004, and other asset-backed liabilities added another
$2.5 trillion. (Federal Reserve Board, 2005, pp. 78–79). By any measure, it
is apparent that securitization, special purpose vehicles (SPVs), and asset-
backed ﬁnancing are a material part of the ﬁnancial world. To give a sense
of scale for these numbers, total on–balance sheet commercial banking li-
abilities (including all deposits) were about $8 trillion.
The chapter has three related and useful sections. The ﬁrst section pro-
vides a readable and concise introduction to securitization and SPVs. While
there are many legal treatises on this topic, this chapter provides an eﬃcient
summary for novices, touching upon the legal forms of SPVs, accounting
rules, treatment under bankruptcy, tax provisions, and credit enhance-
ment. The authors go on to describe securitization, providing an introduc-
tion to trusts, the concept of seller’s interest, excess spreads, and early
amortization. While this section is extremely valuable, there may have been
a missed opportunity to sharpen the piece by helping the reader understand
key economic dimensions along which various securitization vehicles dif-
fer. For example, pools vary depending on whether there is a single con-
tributor of assets or multiple contributors to the pool; whether the assets 
in the pool are relatively standard versus less well understood; or whether
the pool is marketed to a handful of well-informed investors versus sold
broadly in the market. These functional dimensions could inﬂuence the
propensity of the sponsor to bail out an SPV that becomes insolvent.
The second section of the paper provides a model for the existence of
SPVs. The ultimate version of the model recognizes that the sponsor (the
bank) can aﬀect the quality of the assets after the investor buys securities
issued by the SPV. This corresponds to the situation in which a credit card
issuer essentially “reloads” the receivables in an asset-backed credit card
securitization routinely. There might be incentives for the bank to stuﬀ
low-quality assets into the pool or to expend less eﬀort, both of which af-
fect the quality of on–balance sheet and oﬀ–balance sheet projects.
The model produces a variety of insights. At one level, it advances one
explanation why banks would choose to securitize in the ﬁrst place. The
costs of securitization are the cost of setting up the SPV and the loss of tax
advantages to debt, because debt issued by the SPV does not generate tax
beneﬁts to the sponsor. The beneﬁt of securitization is a reduction in bank-
ruptcy costs, because the SPV is bankruptcy remote. These costs are pro-
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costs of distress were related to the type of asset contributed to the pool,
this might produce diﬀerent results. This might be the case if the sponsor
were to select assets for inclusion in the pool based on the extent to which
they might deteriorate in value in ﬁnancial distress.) Since the SPV cannot
go bankrupt, ﬁnancing in this way reduces the costs of ﬁnancial distress
and in turn reduces the cost of debt ﬁnancing.
While the reduction of ﬁnancial distress may be one reason why ﬁrms
choose to securitize, it may not be the only—or most important—ration-
ale for the practice. Securitization and SPVs can be used to get more at-
tractive accounting treatment, to be more tax eﬃcient, to avoid regulations
(such as capital requirements), to tap new pools of capital through chang-
ing the risk characteristics of an asset, or to form more transparent fund-
ing vehicles and in turn reduce deadweight costs due to information asym-
metries. While these other rationales for SPVs and securitization may not
be inconsistent with the simple tradeoﬀpresented by Gorton and Souleles,
they could lead to a richer understanding of the phenomena than provided
in their model. Put another way, it is hard to tell if the model is evaluating
a ﬁrst-order factor or a secondary explanation for securitization.
The series of models produces a second insight, which is probably more
broadly applicable than the ﬁrst. Were the sponsor to succumb to the
moral hazard of expending less eﬀort on projects or the strategic adverse
selection of stuﬃng poor projects into the pool, it might completely disrupt
the equilibrium in which it chooses to issue the asset-backed securities
(ABS) and investors choose to purchase the ABS. But, if the bank can com-
mit to subsidize the SPV, that is, bail it out if its assets fall short of its
liabilities, then it can return to the mutually beneﬁcial equilibrium. But
because the sponsor cannot explicitly commit to the bailout without
jeopardizing its oﬀ–balance sheet treatment, it must implicitly do so. Gor-
ton and Souleles model this in equilibrium using a repeated SPV game, in
which if the sponsor fails to support a failing SPV, it is precluded from rais-
ing funds again in this way for some “punishment period.”
In essence, this model describes a “wink-wink-wink” equilibrium, where
issuer, investor—and regulator—willingly turn a blind eye to the sponsor
providing credit support. In this equilibrium, even lenders to the ﬁrm are
fully informed and do not object to the credit support. To the contrary, 
all parties acknowledge that the bank might choose to voluntarily support 
the SPV in all but the most dire circumstances, when it could not support
itself ﬁrst. In the same way that parents of healthy adult sons and daugh-
ters are under no legal responsibility to continue to house and feed them,
sponsors voluntarily choose to take care of the liabilities of their progeny—
the SPVs.
Higgins and Mason (2004) have a related paper that demonstrates that
this type of credit support indeed occurs. They study nineteen credit card
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riod 1987 through 2001, and found that in seventeen of the cases, the spon-
sor provided some form of recourse. Most of these sponsors were large,
strong institutions, including Citibank, BancOne, AT&T, Sears Roebuck,
and others. Only two sponsors chose not to provide recourse, and both
subsequently failed. Apparently regulators did not object to this credit
support—indeed, one can imagine that regulators would like to avoid sit-
uations in which large institutions had aﬃliated ﬁnancing vehicles in dis-
tress. An inspection of the names—and clustered timing of the early amor-
tizations—makes one less conﬁdent that this is a story about either moral
hazard or adverse selection, but rather about downturns in the economy
that aﬀected strong and weak institutions alike. While this would not take
away from the overall model, it would question the way it was set up.
Higgins and Mason ﬁnd that the banks providing support enjoy positive
short-term returns, positive long-run returns, and positive long-term op-
erating performance. While there is some abnormal delay in issuance
cycles, the largest institutions suﬀered none. In eﬀect, it appears that the
market responded positively to these institutions’ willingness and ability to
protect investors in their ABS.
Gorton and Souleles’ empirical work complements these ﬁndings. They
ﬁnd, perhaps not surprisingly, that the spreads demanded by investors in
credit card securitizations are a function of the rating of the sponsor, even
though technically the investors in the asset-backed securities have no le-
gal recourse against the sponsor. This result persists after controlling for
various deal structure characteristics, aggregate measures of asset qual-
ity, and year ﬁxed eﬀects. The biggest worry—which they address as best
as they can, but not convincingly—is that there is a common factor that
aﬀects both the riskiness of the ﬁrm and of the assets it puts into the ABS.
For example, a subprime lender may have borrowers who are ﬁnancially
weak, and both their loans and their credit cards may reﬂect this weakness.
If the credit card loans are securitized, but the loans held on–balance sheet,
their positive correlation between the institution’s bond rating and the
spread on its ABS notes could simply reﬂect this common risk factor.
Nevertheless, the evidence is strongly suggestive that investors in credit
card ABS look to the sponsor for potential credit support. (This would
suggest a result not given in the paper; that the ratings eﬀect of the sponsor
should be greater when the ABS assets themselves are otherwise weaker,
predicting an interaction eﬀect between ratings and variables capturing as-
set quality.) To put the analogy back into familial terms, it suggests that in-
vestors are demanding a lower premium when lending to the children of
rich parents, even if the parents do not formally cosign the loan. The eco-
nomic eﬀect of parent ﬁnancial strength is material: ABS issued by the
riskiest (B-rated) sponsors pay 46 basis points more than those issued by
AA sponsors. In addition, Gorton and Souleles ﬁnd that riskier banks are
600 Gary B. Gorton and Nicholas S. Soulelesmore likely to use ssecuritization although this result is not nearly as robust
as the former result.
It is important to step back from this solid work and ask: What does this
mean for executives in banks? Investors in banks? Regulators of the ﬁnan-
cial services sector? Ratings agencies? Recognition of material noncon-
tractual implicit support, or “moral recourse,” reminds us that ﬁrms and
businesses are more than nexuses of written contracts. A host of unwritten
and legally unsupportable agreements deﬁne business, as elsewhere in life.
Whether they are enforced by threat of retributions—or by a sense of fair
dealing—is hard to say.
The evidence in the chapter suggests that the market (at least the ABS
market) is aware of the implicit relationships between sponsor and SPV
and sets prices accordingly. Whether “accordingly” is correct is an inter-
esting question: Do ABS investors properly estimate the conditional like-
lihood of moral recourse? If not, in what circumstances do they get it
wrong? Going further, the problems with this unwritten deal may be more
of a problem for risk managers, security holders of the sponsor, regulators,
and the general business public.
First, from the perspective of risk managers, failure to take into account
implicit support can possibly underestimate economic pressure on the
sponsor in certain circumstances. There may be instances when the parent
faces greater cash ﬂow demands by virtue of its unwritten support prom-
ises; however, the voluntary nature of the payments suggests that simple
models might be inappropriate to capture the eﬀects. “Left tail” outcomes
for the SPV contribute to the sponsor only if the sponsor itself is not expe-
riencing one. Second, from the perspective of security holders of the spon-
sor, we have no evidence whether the implicit promises are factored into
their pricing of the parent’s securities. This is probably more of an issue for
equity holders, because as residual claimants they would experience the
economic brunt of the payments to support SPVs. Third, from the per-
spective of regulators, failure to take this support into account might give
a misleading picture of true bank ﬁnancial health, and could also give a
false impression about the interrelationships that lead to systemic risk.
However, given the voluntary nature of the payments, it may be less im-
portant in understanding potential calamity. However, were the ABS mar-
kets to close down because of a sudden shock and round of defaults, this
could give rise to liquidity pressures that could have material business con-
sequences.
Finally, while it seems reassuring that implicit contracts and trust exist
even in the world of SPVs and ABS, to a nonlawyer there seems to be a
certain disingenuousness when rules seem to say one thing (at least to a
layperson), yet are interpreted in another way. Conﬁdence in the ﬁnancial
system, or the legal system, or the regulatory system seems compromised
somehow, in ways that go far beyond this paper.
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Discussion Summary
Charles Calomiris opened the general discussion by expressing a bit of
skepticism that bankruptcy costs are the sole driver of the large-scale se-
curitization that we see. An additional possibility is that adverse selection
problems are mitigated by learning about asset quality, which takes place
when assets are transferred to a special purpose vehicle. Both rating agen-
cies and at least some investors closely scrutinize disclosure about the na-
ture of such assets, and such disclosures would not occur if the assets re-
mained on the balance sheet of the sponsor.
Patricia Jackson suggested, and Richard Evans agreed, that segmenta-
tion of funding markets is an additional motivation for securitization. Be-
cause many tranches of securitizations are typically bought by nonbank in-
vestors, a commercial bank may be able to attract buyers for paper on
better terms than it could in the interbank or commercial-paper markets,
where investors’ single-name exposure limits may begin to bind as scale in-
creases. Hayne Leland suggested that a ﬁnancial institution may be able to
lever up more by securitizing with implicit support.
A spirited debate about the role of regulatory capital arbitrage in securi-
tization was opened by Martin Feldstein’s suggestion that it is material.
Michel Crouhyagreed, noting that regulatory capital requirements are typ-
ically reduced by a securitization even though most or all risk is retained,
and Mark Saidenberg suggested that banks have fought too hard recently
to retain regulatory permissions for the contractual features that set up im-
plicit support for regulatory-capital considerations to be immaterial. But
Richard Cantor noted that securitization continues, even though regula-
tory sanctions have recently increased in cases where support occurs, and
Charles Calomiris noted that securitization is a common tool of unregu-
lated institutions like ﬁnance companies. Nicholas Souleles closed the dis-
cussion by agreeing that regulatory capital considerations may have some
role. Their paper is intended to focus on other considerations that also have
a role in securitization decisions.
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